• Battle for Selangor Part 3

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 29th of September, 2017

    Battle for Selangor Part 3

    In this concluding part on the “Battle for Selangor” in GE14, I analyse the projected outcomes for the state seats in Selangor under three possible scenarios which are summarized in Table 1 below.

    Table 1: Projected Change Malay, Chinese, Indian and Other support in GE14 (compared to GE13)

    I assume that PAS (and its coalition partners) will contest in ALL 56 state seats in Selangor. In the seats which PAS contested in for GE13, I project that the level of Malay support for PAS will drop by 15%, 20% and 25% respectively in GE14. This means that if PAS obtained 40% of the Malay vote in GE13, its share of Malay support will drop by 25%, 20% and 15% respectively under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. I also project that PAS’ non-Malay support will take a tremendous dive – by 80% among Chinese voters, by 60% among Indian voters and by 50% among Other voters.

    In the seats contested by the DAP and PKR in GE13, I project that PAS will win 25%, 20% and 15% of Malay support in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. I project a negligible level of non-Malay support (at around 1%) for PAS in GE14.

    Are these realistic projections? Keep in mind that PAS’ Malay support in the Sungai Besar by-election dropped by 10% from 40% to 30%. Given the inclusion of BERSATU in Pakatan Harapan (PH), the strengthening of the PH leadership and the breaking off of ties between PAS and PKR, it is not unrealistic to think that Malay support for PAS will drop further in GE14. And in the case of a Malay tsunami, which is what is projected in Scenario 3, it is not unrealistic to see many PAS and even UMNO supporters throwing their support behind PH in GE14.

    The non-Malay support for PAS in the Sungai Besar by-election was negligible. There is nothing which PAS has done since this by-election which can convince non-Malay voters to keep supporting PAS in GE14.

    There are many indications that overall Malay support for the BN will fall in GE14. The impact of the GST and the increase in the cost of living have been felt by rural and urban voters. Support for Najib among the Malays is far lower than what it was in GE13. BERSATU, led by Tun Dr. Mahathir and Tan Sri Muhyiddin, have allowed PH to venture into UMNO strongholds that were previously closed to the opposition coalition.

    The question now is not if the Malay support for the BN will drop but by how much. In Scenario 1, I project a loss of 5% Malay support for the BN, a not unrealistic figure given that voters in Selangor are more ‘sophisticated’ (a point I argued in Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”) and hence, more aware of not just the impact of the GST but also other issues to do with good governance such as 1MDB and FELDA. The Malay support for the BN remains unchanged compared to GE13 in Scenario 1.

    In Scenario 2, I project a slightly larger decrease in the Malay support for the BN – a fall of 8% – and a smaller drop in non-Malay support of 3%. And in Scenario 3, which my colleague Liew Chin Tong has termed a ‘Malay tsunami’, the Malay support for the BN falls by 10% (with a drop of 5% support among non-Malays).

    What are the projected outcomes under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3? The results are summarized in Table 2 below.

    Table 2: Projected BN and PH state seats won under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3

    In Scenario 1, PH is projected to win 35 out of 56 state seats. Even though this is less than the 44 state seats Pakatan Rakyat won in GE13, it is still sufficient for PH to form the next state government in Selangor.

    In Scenario 2, which is a mini-Malay tsunami, PH is projected to win 43 state seats, one seat short of what PR achieved in GE13.

    In Scenario 3, which is the Malay tsunami scenario, PH is projected to win 50 state seats.

    I want to highlight three points from this analysis.

    Firstly, the projections clearly show that PAS cannot prevent PH from forming the next government in Selangor, even under the most pessimistic scenario (from PH’s perspective), which is Scenario 1.

    Secondly, the projections show that PAS will be left with no seats after GE14 in Selangor. The reason is simple. PAS will be left with almost no non-Malay support which is important in a multi-racial state like Selangor where non-Malays comprise 49% of all voters. And it cannot win enough Malay support on its own to win any state seats.

    Thirdly, PH is in the best position to capture the political dividends in the event of a Malay tsunami. PH can campaign credibly to change the policies of the federal government which are unpopular with the rakyat. PAS cannot campaign in the same manner. PAS cannot even say that it will be the kingmaker in Selangor because it is not likely to win even a single seat. With a strategic campaign, PH can reap the benefits of a possible Scenario 3 by winning more state seats than even the 2013 general elections in GE14.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

  • Battle for Selangor Part 2

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 27th of September, 2017

    Battle for Selangor Part 2

    In Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”, I showed evidence from past elections on how voters in Selangor are very quick to punish what they perceive to be ineffective governments and how they are quick to reward parties which can deliver good governance.

    In Part 2 of the “Battle for Selangor”, I discuss the political circumstances which can limit the amount of damage PAS can do in three corner fights in the upcoming general election.

    A common perception among political observers and analysts is that contests involving BN, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and PAS will likely result in a victory for the BN. The Sungai Besar and Kuala Kangsar by-elections, which were contested by the BN, PAS and AMANAH and which were won by the BN with increased majorities (compared to GE2013) are often used as evidence that three corner fights will be in the BN’s favour.

    I do not dispute that straight fights against the BN would be the ideal situation for the opposition. But I want to use the following three points to show that PH can still win Selangor even in the presence of three corner fights involving PAS.

    (i) The political landscape has changed since the Sungai Besar and Kuala Kangsar by-elections.

    The political stakes for voters in by-elections are not very high. Voters know that they are not deciding the future of a state or federal government. Local issues become more important than state and national issues. Voter turnout is also significantly lower than in general elections. The fact that the BN would perform better in these by-elections is thus not that surprising.

    The political landscape has changed significantly since the two by-elections in June 2016. Back then, BERSATU had not been formed yet. Tun Dr. Mahathir and Tan Sri Muhyiddin had not been sacked by UMNO. PAS had not yet broken off ties with PKR. BERSATU had not yet joined Pakatan Harapan. The Pakatan Harapan leadership line-up had not been established. More than a year after the two by-elections, it is increasingly clear to voters that there are now two distinct and broad-based coalitions which can form the next federal government and the state government in Selangor. PAS does not feature in either coalition.

    In the context of a general election where voters have to choose who forms the next state and federal governments, it would be a mistake to assume that all those voters who supported PAS in past elections would continue to support PAS in the next general election.

    The more we make the next elections a stark choice between supporting a BN government led by a world renowned kleptocrat and a historic opportunity to change to an alternative coalition with a proven track record of governing two states for two terms, the likelier it is that more voters will not want to ‘waste’ their vote on a third-party candidate which has no chance of forming the government at either the state or federal level.

    In general elections prior to 1990, in seats featuring two or more opposition parties, voters never had to face the choice between an opposition coalition that could form the next state or federal government. In a contest featuring BN, DAP and PAS, pro-opposition voters did not have to think of whether DAP or PAS would form the next state or federal government. In GE14, this choice is now available to pro-opposition voters given that there is a real chance that PH could win Putrajaya and very likely retain control of the Selangor state government.

    As such, past assumptions about how voters would vote in a multi-corner fight must be revised.

    (ii) PAS’ political success in Selangor is relatively recent

    One of the reasons political observers tend to overestimate PAS’ overall support in Selangor is because of the 15 state and 4 parliament seats won by PAS in GE13. But they forget that PAS’ electoral success in Selangor is a relatively recent phenomenon.

    According to Table 1 below, PAS did not win a single parliament seat in Selangor from 1990 to 2004. Even in the 1999 Reformasi elections where PAS emerged as the largest opposition party in parliament and won control of the Terengganu state government (and retained the Kelantan state government), it only managed to win 4 state seats in Selangor namely the Sungai Besar state seat in Sabak Bernam, the Sungai Burung state seat in Tanjung Karang, the Gombak Setia state seat in Gombak and the Kajang state seat in Hulu Langat.[1]

    Even in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, PAS only managed to win 52.9% and 54.3% of the popular vote respectively in the parliament seats it contested and 49.5% and 54.9% of the popular vote respectively in the state seats it contested. And as we shall see in the next point, a large proportion of this support was from the non-Malay voters which are likely to abandon PAS in droves in GE14.

    Of course, PAS can respond by saying that DAP and PKR’s electoral success in Selangor is also a relatively recent phenomenon. And they would be right in saying this. The difference is that DAP and PKR are part of a larger political coalition, Pakatan Harapan, which has a legitimate chance of forming the next federal government and are in a strong position to retain the Selangor government. On the other hand, for the first time since 1986, PAS is in a political isolated position (putting aside the stillborn Gagasan Sejahtera coalition) with no chance of forming either the state or federal government on its own.[2]

    (iii) PAS did not win a majority of Malay votes in Selangor in GE2013

    Perhaps the best evidence of PAS’ strength in Selangor can be seen its performance in the 2013 general elections where it won a historic 15 out of the 20 state seats it contested in. Table 3 below shows the estimated level of support for PAS by Malay, Chinese and Indian voters in the 15 state seats it won in GE2013.[3]

    From Table 3, what is clear is that PAS failed to win more than 50% of Malay votes in all except one of the state seats it won (the exception is N26 Bangi). The average Malay support for PAS in the seats it won is approximately 40%. PAS managed to win 14 out of 15 state seats in Selangor in GE2013 because of the high non-Malay support it received – an estimated 88% of Chinese and 68% of Indian support in these seats.

    I would make the argument that PAS Malay support in newly won seats in GE2013 such as Seri Serdang, Paya Jaras and Morib, was largely due to the fact that it was part of a larger opposition coalition rather than because of its grassroot strength and support. Once PAS is no longer part of an opposition coalition, not only would its non-Malay support drop precipitously, I would argue that in many areas, PAS support among the Malay community would also fall.

    Challenge for Pakatan Harapan (PH) in Selangor

    There is a phenomenon that has been documented in political science called Duverger’s law which states that in first past the post single member constituency electoral systems which is used in countries like Malaysia, the United Kingdom and the United States, voters tend to focus their votes on two parties (or two coalitions, in the case of Malaysia).[4] In other words, most voters tend not to want to ‘waste’ their votes on third party candidates because they know that these candidates have little chance of winning the seat. This does not mean that third party candidates will get no votes but that they will get relatively few votes.

    PH can expedite the move towards two coalition competition in Selangor by taking the following steps.

    Firstly, it can and should make it clear to voters that PAS will not be part of the Selangor state government after GE14 regardless of the outcome. This will provide a further incentive for pro-opposition voters to choose PH over PAS especially if they do not want the BN to recapture the Selangor state government.

    Secondly, PH must actively court fence sitters and PAS sympathisers to continue to vote for a PH government in Selangor in GE14. As I’ve argued in Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”, many voters in Selangor do not have very strong party loyalties. Many of the voters who voted for PAS in GE13, especially the Malay voters, can be persuaded to switch their votes to another party in PH on the basis that PH can form the next government in Selangor and in Putrajaya.

    Thirdly, PH must focus its attention on comparing and contrasting itself to the BN and not go all out to attack PAS. The main political adversary for PH in Selangor and in other states is still the BN. If PH is too obsessed with attacking PAS, this will inevitably alienate many PAS sympathizers.

    At the end of the day, given Azmin Ali’s popularity as the current Menteri Besar of Selangor, especially among the Malay community, there is no reason why he cannot lead PH in Selangor to a convincing victory in GE14 even if PH has to go up against the BN and PAS in some seats including his own parliamentary seat of Gombak and his state seat of Bukit Antarabangsa.

    In Part 3 of this series, I will show the possible electoral outcomes for GE14 under different assumptions of how many votes PAS can obtain in the context of three corner fights. By showing these results, I hope that I can convince some of the sceptics that despite having 3 corner fights, PH can still regain control of the Selangor state government.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

    [1] This was prior to the 2003 delimitation exercise which reconfigured many of the seats which PAS won to make it more difficult for them to retain these seats in the 2004 general elections.

    [2] PAS was part of the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU) coalition with Semangat 46 in 1990 and 1995, the Barisan Alternative in 1999 and 2004 and Pakatan Rakyat after the 2008 general elections.

    [3] The Indian support could not be calculated in all seats because not all seats have a large enough % of Indian voters.

    [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law

  • The battle for Selangor in GE14 (Part 1)

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 26th of September, 2017

    The battle for Selangor in GE14 (Part 1)

    It is no secret that the Barisan Nasional (BN) is desperate to win back Selangor at all costs in the upcoming general election. The reasons are obvious. Selangor is the richest state in Malaysia by economic output. Many big-ticket infrastructure projects such as the East Coast Rail Line (ECRL), the High Speed Rail (HSR), the LRT and MRT projects, water projects and new toll roads, require the approval of the Selangor state government. Having a well-governed Pakatan Harapan (PH) state government on the doorstep of Putrajaya is also a headache for the BN because voters can compare and contrast the performance of the Selangor state government with other BN state governments as well as the Federal Government.

    What are the chances of the BN recapturing Selangor in GE14? The answer lies partly with the outcome of the expected three corner fights which will occur between the BN, PH and PAS. Before I go into the analysis of possible outcomes in three corner fights, it is important to understand the nature of voters in Selangor. Voters in Selangor are perhaps the most ‘sophisticated’ in the whole country and because of this, their voting patterns are also the most volatile. Let me illustrate by using the general election results from 1990 onwards.

    Figure 1 below shows the level of BN support in states which have been won or are held by the opposition namely Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Perak and Selangor from 1990 to 2013.

    Figure 1: BN support in Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Perak and Selangor (GE1990 to GE2013)

    BN support in Selangor is the most volatile among all these frontline states. For example, the BN support in Selangor (highlighted in bold) increased from 54.8% to 72.4%, a massive spike, due to the high economic growth enjoyed by the country during the ‘East Asian’ miracle years from the early 1990s until just before the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Support for the BN in Selangor fell to 54.8% during the 1999 Reformasi elections. It then increased to 62.8% in 2004 during the Pak Lah ‘tsunami’ before falling to 43.4% in the 2008 BN backlash elections and falling to 38.4% in the 2013 GE.

    Figure 2 below shows the changes in the level of BN support in these key stations from 1990 to 2013 with the figures for Selangor highlighted in bold. Figure 2 shows more clearly the level of volatility which Selangor voters exhibit from one election to another. From 1990 to 1995, BN support increased by 17.7%, the highest among all key states. BN support fell by 17.7% from 1995 to 1999, also the highest among all key states. From 2004 to 2008, BN support fell by 19.4%, the highest among all key states, which led to a change in government in Selangor.

    Figure 2: Change in BN support in key states (GE1990 to GE2013)

    Does the volatility shown by Selangor voters means that the BN can hope to win back Selangor based solely on its performance and leadership? This would be wishful thinking on the part of BN leaders. One of the main reasons why Selangor voters exhibit such volatility is that they are the fastest to reward good performance and also the fastest to punish bad performance. They rewarded the BN in 1995 for delivering economic growth and prosperity and they swung against the BN in 1999 because of the economic and political crisis during Reformasi (albeit not by enough for the BN to lose this state then). They swung against the BN in record numbers in 2008 because of dissatisfaction against Pak Lah due to undelivered election promises. There is nothing in BN’s track record and leadership which indicates that voters in Selangor will reward it in the next general election especially when the best the BN can do is to parade out a line-up of 3 ex-Menteri Besars, one of whom was convicted of corruption and another who was found carrying a suitcase full of cash to Australia.

    The track record of the Selangor state government, while not perfect, has been positively felt by the voters in the state through many of the welfare programs under the ‘Inisiatif Peduli Rakyat’ umbrella including free medical cards for low income families and individuals and free buses in each of the districts / municipalities in the state. Investments and jobs continue to pour into Selangor. The high popularity of Selangor Menteri Besar, Azmin Ali, stands in stark contrast to that of Prime Minister Najib Razak.

    A large number of the more than 2 million voters in Selangor are not originally from Selangor. Many of them move to Selangor because of better job and educational opportunities. As such, many of them are not attached to any political party i.e. they are not ‘hard-core’ BN or opposition supporters. Many of these voters also have better access to information including social and online media. They are not ‘brainwashed’ by mainstream media. Many of these voters also have higher income and education profiles compared to other states. And the number of newly registered voters is the highest in Selangor compared to other states.

    All these reasons explain why most Selangor voters will vote practically i.e. by rewarding the party or coalition which promises to give them what they want namely better governance that will keep the streets clean, deliver better welfare programs, provide properly paved roads and improve the quality of life. These are also reasons why it is very possible for Pakatan Harapan (PH) to retain most of the seats which were won by Pakatan Rakyat in GE13 even in the case of three corner fights.

    I will provide the evidence in Part 2 of my statement.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

  • Has the Election Commission just implicated itself by admitting that it has destroyed the electoral rolls it used for the 1994 and 2003 delimitation exercises?

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 22nd of July, 2017

    Has the Election Commission just implicated itself by admitting that it has destroyed the electoral rolls it used for the 1994 and 2003 delimitation exercises?

    The recent decision made by the Court of Appeal on Thursday, 20th of July, 2017, to set aside the High Court order for the Election Commission to provide the Selangor government information on 136,272 registered voters without proper addresses, may seem like a setback for those seeking to put a stop to the ongoing delimitation exercise. But part of the argument used by the federal counsel – namely that the Election Commission had discarded the records of these voters from the electoral rolls used in the 1994 and 2003 delimitation exercise – may come back to haunt the Election Commission.

    The Selangor government can still appeal the Court of Appeal judgment at the Federal Court. But even if it loses the appeal at the apex court, the judicial review filed by the Selangor government against the Election Commission will still have to be heard at the High Court (Proceedings were postponed while waiting for the Court of Appeal decision stated above).

    Recall that in December 2016, the High Court granted leave to the Selangor state government for its judicial review challenging the constitutionality of the ongoing delimitation exercise, which started on the 15th of September, 2016.

    To recap, the judicial review case brought forth by the Selangor government was based on the following four grounds:

    1. Ground ONE: The EC’s Proposals are Unconstitutional as Tainted by Malapportionment and Gerrymandering
    2. Ground TWO: The Electoral Roll Complaint:  Unconstitutionality arising from the EC’s failure to use the Current Electoral Rolls
    3. Ground THREE: Election Commission’s Use of a Defective Electoral Roll With Missing Addresses of Voters
    4. Ground FOUR: Insufficient Particulars in the Proposed Recommendations Which Impaired Right To Make Meaningful Representations

    By admitting that it has destroyed previous records of voters, including details containing the addresses of these voters, the Election Commission may have opened the door for its ongoing delimitation exercise to be questioned under Ground THREE (see above), which is the use of a defective electoral roll to conduct the delimitation exercise.

    To make things easier to understand, let me illustrate with a simple example. Jalan Cheras is a very long road which starts in the heart of Kuala Lumpur at the intersection between Jalan Pudu and Jalan Tun Razak. It snakes through many housing areas in Cheras before finally ending in the center of Kajang town. (One has to remember that the naming of this road predated the creation of the Federal Territories Kuala Lumpur so the entire Jalan Cheras would have been in the state of Selangor)

    Imagine if the voter was assigned to a particular locality along Jalan Cheras and the exact address of this voter was subsequently destroyed. How will the Election Commission determine which constituency this voter will be placed if the boundaries of the constituencies of the seats along Jalan Cheras were to be changed? At the time of writing, under the boundaries used in the 2013 general elections, Jalan Cheras passes through the P123 Cheras parliamentary constituency and the N23 Dusun Tua and N25 Kajang state seats in the P101 Hulu Langat parliament constituency. With the rapid development which has happened and is currently happening along Jalan Cheras, how can the EC accurately determine which constituency to place a voter without knowing his or her exact address?

    In reality, the dirty little secret which the EC already knows but does not want to admit to is that our electoral roll is seriously flawed. In the past, when the BN was dominant and there was little scrutiny of the electoral roll, the EC allowed politicians (mostly from the BN) to register voters en masse with little regard to knowing exactly where these voters were living at. Some had complete addresses, others didn’t. Prior to 2002, voters did not need to register according to their IC address. We are still living with this legacy till today. Which is why there is a large number of voters without complete addresses even in developed states like Selangor and Kuala Lumpur.

    This much was clear to me as I uncovered various problems associated with the electoral roll under the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (MERAP) in 2012.

    This is also the reason why lawyers representing the EC always refer to Section 9A of the Elections Act 1958 which prevents a gazetted electoral roll from being challenged in court. They hide behind this so-called ‘defense’ even though in this particular case, the Selangor government is not questioning the inclusion of these 136,272 voters in the electoral roll, but is asking for more information to determine if the constituency delimitation process has been carried out in accordance to constitutional principles.

    The fight against the unfair delimitation exercise will continue. The judicial review case taken up by the Selangor government has prevented the Election Commission from starting the First Round of the constitutionally mandated public hearing process. The High Court also recently ruled in favour of the Selangor state government by granting an injuction application to stop the Election Commission from passing the delimitation exercise proposal to the Prime Minister without the inclusion of Selangor.

    The judicial review in the High Court will continue. In the worst of circumstances, even if the High Court rules against the Selangor government, the EC must complete two rounds of a public hearing including a public display of maps and relevant information between rounds one and two before the delimitation exercise for Peninsular Malaysia can be completed. This gives time for the Selangor government to mount an appeal all the way up to the Federal Court if necessary.

    There is also another High Court hearing on the right of the EC to move voters from the Batang Kali state seat to the Kuala Kubu state seat in Selangor during the ‘boundary correction’ exercise which took place in April 2016.

    The Election Commission must be surprised by the slew of court cases taken up by the Pakatan Harapan state governments in Selangor and Penang and by groups of affected voters in various states including Penang, Perak, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Melaka and Johor. Even though some of these cases have been ruled in the favour of the EC, it must know that the will of the people cannot be defeated so easily, especially when the pressure for reforming our electoral system is maintained by organisations such as BERSIH and by supporters who want clean and fair elections in Malaysia.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

  • Is the Election Commission (EC) trying to add voters via the ‘back door’ to help the BN win the next General Election?

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 31st of May, 2017

    Is the Election Commission (EC) trying to add voters via the ‘back door’ to help the BN win the next General Election?

    I was shocked when I received a photo yesterday of the display of new voters for the First Quarter, 2017 at the offices of the Selangor Election Commission in Shah Alam. In the picture, it was stated that the list of voters displayed were “Pameran Senarai Tuntutuan” or Display of List Based on Claims (See Figure 1 below).

    Figure 1: Display of List based on Claims at the Selangor Election Commission office in Shah Alam

    As far as I know, this is the first time where I have seen a display of a list of voters based on ‘tuntutan’ or claims. Unlike the display of the quarterly “Rang Daftar Pemilih Tambahan (RDPT)”, the Election Commission did not make any media statement to notify the public that these additional names to be added into the electoral roll were on display nor did the Election Commission display these names in locations in each of the parliamentary areas in Selangor.

    The EC is making use of a little used and little known section of the Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 2002 – Section 14 – which states the following:

    Section 14 of the Regulations is supposed to address the problem of genuine mistakes by the Election Commission, for example, in the case where an EC staff forget to input a name into the latest RDPT or for some reason, the information of a voter who registers at a post office fails to be included in the latest RDPT.

    However, according to data collected by PEMUDA AMANAH, a total of 28416 voters were added using Section 14 of the Regulations in this most recent display including 1,170 voters in Selangor (See Figure 2 below). Does the EC expected us to believe that it somehow ‘forgot’ to include over 28,000 voters in the RDPT for Quarter 1, 2017? In addition, why is there a big rush on the part of the EC to add these voters now rather than to wait until the public display of the RDPT for Quarter 2, 2017? Is it because the EC wants to make sure that these voters are on the electoral roll if the General Elections were to be called in September?

    Figure 2: Number of voters added using Section 14 of the Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 2002
    Source: PEMUDA AMANAH

    An analysis of the voters added in Selangor shows that all of the voters added are based in military camps and / or are military voters and their spouses (See sample in Figure 3 below). Let me clearly state that I am not objecting to the addition of army voters into the electoral roll. Rather, I am questioning the procedure by which they have been added.

    I have written to the Director of the Selangor Election Commission to explain the addition of these voters and why they were not added during the public display of the first quarter, 2017, of the RDPT. The failure of the EC to provide an adequate explanation will jeopardise public trust in the integrity of the electoral roll.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

    Figure 3: Sample of Military voters added via Section 14 of the Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 2002

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