• “雪兰莪之战”最终章

    (2017年9月29日)沙登区国会议员王建民博士的媒体声明

    “雪兰莪之战”最终章

    在本篇第14届大选“雪兰莪之战”的最终章里,我分析了下列雪兰莪州选举的三种预测结果和可能性。

    首先,我假设伊斯兰党(及其选举联盟成员)将在雪兰莪州的所有56个州议席上竞选。在伊斯兰党在第13届大选里竞选的席位中,我预计在下一届大选中,马来选民对伊斯兰党的支持水平将分别下滑15%,20%和25%。这意味着如果伊斯兰党在第13届大选中获得了40%的马来选票,那在第1,2和3的预测中,其马来选民的支持将分别下滑25%,20%和15%。同时,我也预测伊斯兰党的非马来人票仓中,80%的华裔选民,60%印裔选民和50%其他选民将弃投伊党。

    针对行动党和公正党在第13届大选所竞选的议席中,我通过第1,2和3的可能性中预测伊党将分别赢得25%,20%和15%的马来选票。另外,我预测非马来选民的支持率约为 1%(可被忽略不计)。

    上述预测是否务实呢?我们别忘记伊党在大港补选中的马来选民支持率从40%下滑了10%至30%。有鉴于团结党加入希望联盟,希盟的领导层进一步地巩固,公正党与伊斯兰党划清界线,因此我们对伊斯兰党的马来选民支持率将在第14届大选进一步下滑预测并非不切实际的。若马来海啸如实发生,便会应验第3种预测结果,我们甚至会看到许多伊斯兰党和巫统的支持者在第14届大选中转投希望联盟。

    在大港补选中,非马来人对伊斯兰党的支持率可谓是微不足道的。自从该补选后,伊斯兰党已经无法继续说服非马来选民在第14届大选中支持自己。

    有很多迹象显示马来选民对国阵的支持率将在第14届大选中下滑。城乡选民普遍上都能感受到消费税生活成本上涨所产生的影响和。自从第13届大选,纳吉所获得的支持率大不如从前。 由敦马哈迪和慕尤丁领导的土团党,将允许希望联盟渗入过去在野党无法触及的巫统据点。

    现在的问题不在于马来选民对国阵的支持率会下滑多少。在第1种预测情景,我预测国阵将减少5%的马来选票。这并非不切实际的数据,因为雪兰莪州的选民更加“务实”(“雪兰莪之战”第1集曾触及这个课题)。因此,这些选民除了考虑消费税课题外,也会关注如1MDB和FELDA之类的施政课题。在这个情景下,非马来选民对国阵的支持率则维持不变。

    在第2种情景中,我预测马来选民对国阵的支持率下滑幅度更大,高达8%;非马来选民的支持下滑近3%。。在第3种情景,我就附和刘镇东同事所提出的“马来海啸”预测,即马来选民对国阵的支持下滑10%(非马来选民下滑5%)。

    上述3种情景所产生的预测结果分别是如何呢? 请参阅图表2。

    在第1种情景中,希望联盟预计将赢得56个议席中的35席。尽管这不如民联在第13届大选所赢得的44个议席,但仍然足够让希盟在雪兰莪州执政。

    在第2种情景中,有如迷你马来海啸,希望联盟预计将赢得43席,与民联在第13届大选的成绩相差一个席位。

    在第3种情景中,就如马来海啸来袭,希望联盟预计将赢得50个州议席。

    我想从上述的分析强调3个观点。

    首先,上述预测清楚地表明,即使在最悲观的预测情景下(站在希望联盟的角度来观察),伊斯兰党也无法阻止希望联盟在雪兰莪州执政。这是第1种情景。

    其次,上述预测显示,在第14届大选之后,伊斯兰党在雪兰莪州将无法占有任何席位。原因很简单。伊斯兰党将失去大部分非马来选民的支持,尤其对拥有多元种族社会的雪兰莪很重要,因为非马来人占全体选民的49%。单凭马来选票,伊斯兰党独自无法赢得任何州议席。

    第三,在发生马来海啸的情况下,希望联盟拥有最佳的优势来收割政治红利。 希望联盟可以务实地竞选,针对联邦政府不受欢迎的政策而大力提出替代方案。伊斯兰党则无法以同样的策略来竞选。此外,伊斯兰党甚至无法成为雪兰莪州选举的造王者,因为它不可能赢得任何席位。通过运用对的战略,希望联盟可以赢得比第13届大选更多的议席,应验最乐观的第3种预测情景。

    王建民博士
    沙登区国会议员

  • Battle for Selangor Part 3

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 29th of September, 2017

    Battle for Selangor Part 3

    In this concluding part on the “Battle for Selangor” in GE14, I analyse the projected outcomes for the state seats in Selangor under three possible scenarios which are summarized in Table 1 below.

    Table 1: Projected Change Malay, Chinese, Indian and Other support in GE14 (compared to GE13)

    I assume that PAS (and its coalition partners) will contest in ALL 56 state seats in Selangor. In the seats which PAS contested in for GE13, I project that the level of Malay support for PAS will drop by 15%, 20% and 25% respectively in GE14. This means that if PAS obtained 40% of the Malay vote in GE13, its share of Malay support will drop by 25%, 20% and 15% respectively under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. I also project that PAS’ non-Malay support will take a tremendous dive – by 80% among Chinese voters, by 60% among Indian voters and by 50% among Other voters.

    In the seats contested by the DAP and PKR in GE13, I project that PAS will win 25%, 20% and 15% of Malay support in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. I project a negligible level of non-Malay support (at around 1%) for PAS in GE14.

    Are these realistic projections? Keep in mind that PAS’ Malay support in the Sungai Besar by-election dropped by 10% from 40% to 30%. Given the inclusion of BERSATU in Pakatan Harapan (PH), the strengthening of the PH leadership and the breaking off of ties between PAS and PKR, it is not unrealistic to think that Malay support for PAS will drop further in GE14. And in the case of a Malay tsunami, which is what is projected in Scenario 3, it is not unrealistic to see many PAS and even UMNO supporters throwing their support behind PH in GE14.

    The non-Malay support for PAS in the Sungai Besar by-election was negligible. There is nothing which PAS has done since this by-election which can convince non-Malay voters to keep supporting PAS in GE14.

    There are many indications that overall Malay support for the BN will fall in GE14. The impact of the GST and the increase in the cost of living have been felt by rural and urban voters. Support for Najib among the Malays is far lower than what it was in GE13. BERSATU, led by Tun Dr. Mahathir and Tan Sri Muhyiddin, have allowed PH to venture into UMNO strongholds that were previously closed to the opposition coalition.

    The question now is not if the Malay support for the BN will drop but by how much. In Scenario 1, I project a loss of 5% Malay support for the BN, a not unrealistic figure given that voters in Selangor are more ‘sophisticated’ (a point I argued in Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”) and hence, more aware of not just the impact of the GST but also other issues to do with good governance such as 1MDB and FELDA. The Malay support for the BN remains unchanged compared to GE13 in Scenario 1.

    In Scenario 2, I project a slightly larger decrease in the Malay support for the BN – a fall of 8% – and a smaller drop in non-Malay support of 3%. And in Scenario 3, which my colleague Liew Chin Tong has termed a ‘Malay tsunami’, the Malay support for the BN falls by 10% (with a drop of 5% support among non-Malays).

    What are the projected outcomes under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3? The results are summarized in Table 2 below.

    Table 2: Projected BN and PH state seats won under Scenarios 1, 2 and 3

    In Scenario 1, PH is projected to win 35 out of 56 state seats. Even though this is less than the 44 state seats Pakatan Rakyat won in GE13, it is still sufficient for PH to form the next state government in Selangor.

    In Scenario 2, which is a mini-Malay tsunami, PH is projected to win 43 state seats, one seat short of what PR achieved in GE13.

    In Scenario 3, which is the Malay tsunami scenario, PH is projected to win 50 state seats.

    I want to highlight three points from this analysis.

    Firstly, the projections clearly show that PAS cannot prevent PH from forming the next government in Selangor, even under the most pessimistic scenario (from PH’s perspective), which is Scenario 1.

    Secondly, the projections show that PAS will be left with no seats after GE14 in Selangor. The reason is simple. PAS will be left with almost no non-Malay support which is important in a multi-racial state like Selangor where non-Malays comprise 49% of all voters. And it cannot win enough Malay support on its own to win any state seats.

    Thirdly, PH is in the best position to capture the political dividends in the event of a Malay tsunami. PH can campaign credibly to change the policies of the federal government which are unpopular with the rakyat. PAS cannot campaign in the same manner. PAS cannot even say that it will be the kingmaker in Selangor because it is not likely to win even a single seat. With a strategic campaign, PH can reap the benefits of a possible Scenario 3 by winning more state seats than even the 2013 general elections in GE14.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

  • “雪兰莪之战”第2集

    (2017年9月27日)沙登区国会议员王建民博士的媒体声明

     “雪兰莪之战”第2

    在“雪兰莪之战”的上半集中,我从过去的选举历史中论证了雪兰莪州选民如何务实地惩罚治理差劲的政府及投票给有政绩的政党。

    在“雪兰莪之战”的第二集里,我将会从政治环境来讨论如何最小化伊斯兰党在下届大选中的三角战中所造成的影响。

    许多来自希望联盟,国阵,伊斯兰党的政治观察家和分析家都保持着一个普遍观点,国阵将在三角战中获得胜利。在伊斯兰党和城信党有角逐的双补选中-大港区和江沙区补选,国阵都以大幅度的多数票来赢得选举(与第13届大选相比),因此论证了三角战只对国阵有利。

    当然,我不反对最理想的情况会是希望联盟可以与国阵一对一碰头。但是,我想借用以下三点来论证,即使在伊斯兰党搅局的三角战中,希望联盟仍然可以赢得雪兰莪州政权。

    (i) 大港区和江沙区双补选后的国家政治格局已发生重大变化

    选民在补选中的政治回报并不高。他们都知道补选并不会决定一个州或联邦政府的未来。因此,地方课题比州和国家课题对选民而言更为重要。再者,补选的总投票率也远低于全国大选的记录。所以,国阵在这两场补选中会表现得更好,也并不令人感到惊讶。

    自从那两场补选以来,全国政治格局发生了重大变化。回顾当年,团结党还没有被创立。马哈迪和慕尤丁还没有离开巫统。伊斯兰党尚未与公正党破局。团结党还没有加入希望联盟。希望联盟的领导阵容尚未成立。经过两次补选后,选民已经越来越清楚地意识到如今只有两个截然不同的政治联盟有望组成下一个联邦政府和雪兰莪州政府的主人。伊斯兰党在这两个联盟中都无立足之地。

    如果我们相信所有曾投票给伊斯兰党的选民意识到手中的选票将决定国家和州政府的未来主人,仍在下一届大选重投伊斯兰党,将会是一个天真的错误想法。

    我们只要不断强调下一届大选将会是历史性机会,由世界恶名昭彰的盗国贼所领导的国阵政府对垒一个具有执政良好记录的州政府的替代联盟,那更多选民不会轻易浪费选票在没有机会在州或联邦组成政府的第三方候选人的身上。

    在1990年前的大选中,在两个或多个在野党竞选的席位上,选民从来没有需要在可能影响下一个州或联邦政府的在野党联盟之间作出投票的选择。在国阵,行动党和伊斯兰党之间的选战中,在野党的支持者不必考虑行动党或伊斯兰党是否有机会组成州或联邦政府的可能性。然而,在14届大选中,选民有了这个务实的选择机会,因为希望联盟有机会可以赢得布城政权和很大可能性继续在雪兰莪州执政。

    因此,我们必须重新思考过去针对选民如何在多角战中投票的猜想。

    (ii) 伊斯兰党在雪兰莪州的选举胜利是属于比较近期的成绩

    政治观察家倾向高估PAS在雪兰莪的整体支持的原因之一是由PAS在GE13获得的15个州和4个议会席位。 但他们忘记了PAS在雪兰莪的选举成功是一个比较近的现象。

    根据图表1,伊斯兰党在1990年至2004年期间在雪兰莪州都没有赢得任何的国会议席。即使在1999年烈火莫熄的选举中,虽然伊斯兰党成为国会里最大的在野党和赢得登嘉楼州政权(继续执政吉兰丹 ),它也只能在雪兰莪州赢得4个州议席,分别是沙白安南县的大港(Sungai Besar)州议席,丹绒加弄县的双溪武隆(Sungai Burung)州议席,鹅唛县的鹅唛斯迪亚(Gombak Setia)州议席和乌鲁冷岳县的加影(Kajang)州议席。[1]

    图表1:伊斯兰党在1990年至2013年期间在雪兰莪州所赢得的国会议席和竞选的胜率

    图表2:伊斯兰党在1990年至2013年期间在雪兰莪州所赢得的州议席和竞选的胜率

    即使在2008年和2013年的大选中,伊斯兰党也只能在国会议席上分别获得52.9%和54.3%的普通选票,而在州议席上分别获得49.5%和54.9%的普通选票。正如我们即将看到的数据显示,这很大一部分的非巫裔选民,将可能会在第14届大选中放弃投票给伊斯兰党。

    当然,伊斯兰党也可以回应称,行动党和公正党在雪兰莪州的选举胜利也是一个近期的现象。 这样的说法并无不妥。可不同之处在于,行动党和公正党目前是更大的政治联盟-希望联盟阵容的成员之一,更有机会组成下一个联邦政府,并且有更好的优势来继续执政雪兰莪州。另一方面,自1986年以来,伊斯兰党就在政治上处于孤立的地位(除了人民和谐阵线-Gagasan Sejahtera之外),进而缺乏了组成州政府或联邦政府的机会。[1]

    (iii) 伊斯兰党在第13届大选中并没有赢得雪兰莪州马来选民的多数票

    也许,我们可以用2013年大选的成绩来检视伊斯兰党在雪兰莪州的实力,该党在其中的20个国席中历史性地赢得了15个席位。图表3显示了在该15个州议席中巫裔,华裔和印裔选民对伊斯兰党的支持水平 。[2]

    图表3: 在伊斯兰党所赢得的15个州议席中,巫裔,华裔和印裔选民分别对伊斯兰党的支持水平

    从图表3显示,除了万宜选区外,伊斯兰党在其余的选区都无法赢得超过50%的马来人选票。 马来人对伊斯兰党胜选的议席的平均支持率为40%。因此,伊斯兰党在2013年的大选中,雪兰莪州所赢得的15个州议席中有14个议席,是获得非马来人,估计分别有88%的华裔和68%印裔的高支持率。

    因此,我的观点是伊斯兰党在2013年大选的胜选席位所赢得的马来支持票,如斯里沙登(Seri Serdang),柏也加拉斯(Paya Jaras)和摩立(Morib),主要是因为在野党联盟的效应,而不是得益于自己的基层实力和支持。一旦伊斯兰党不再是在野党联盟的成员之一,我认为非马来人的支持率不仅会急剧下降,马来选民在许多地区对伊斯兰党的支持率也将下降。

    希望联盟在雪兰莪州的挑战

    政治学中有一种称为杜瓦杰法则(Duverger’s Law)。它指出在马来西亚,英国和美国等使用的“领先者当选“选举制度的国家中,选民往往将选票集中在两大阵营(或马来西亚的两大联盟)。[1] 换句话说,大多数选民往往不想在第三方候选人“浪费”自己的选票,因为他们知道这些候选人没有机会赢得这些席位。但,这并不意味着第三方候选人不会获得选票,而是只获得数量相对较少的选票。

    希望联盟可以通过以下步骤加快在雪兰莪州内形成只有两大阵营之间的竞争局面。

    首先,希望联盟可以向选民清楚交代,不管第14届大选的结果如何,伊斯兰党都不会成为新雪兰莪州政府的成员之一。这将进一步鼓励在野党支持者投票给希望联盟,以避免国阵重新夺回雪州政权。

    其次,希望联盟必须积极地拉拢摇摆选民和伊斯兰党同情者,以便在第14届大选的雪兰莪州选举中继续投票给希望联盟政府。正如我在“雪兰莪之战”第1集所提过的观点,雪兰莪的许多选民并没有很强的政党忠诚度。因此,在第13届大选投票给伊斯兰党的选民,特别是马来选民,有机会被说服将其票投给不同的政党,只要他们可以期望希望联盟能在雪兰莪州和布城组成下一届的新政府。

    第三,希望联盟必须集中产生与国阵差异化的竞争形象,而不是全力以赴地攻击伊斯兰党。 雪兰莪州和其他州的主要政治对手仍然是国阵。 如果希望联盟太痴迷于攻击伊斯兰党,这将不可避免地会疏远了许多伊斯兰党的同情者。

    最后,由于现任雪州大臣阿兹敏,受到特别是马来社区的爱戴,因此他仍有希望领军在雪兰莪州取得令人信服的胜利,哪怕是希望联盟不得不与国阵和伊斯兰党在一些席位竞选,包括鹅唛(Gombak)国席和国际山庄(Bukit Antarabangsa)州议席。

    在本系列的第3集中,根据不同假设,我将提供在第14届大选中若发生三角战,伊斯兰党会获得多少票的可能性和选举结果。通过这些数据,我希望我可以说服某些有疑虑的人,即使发生三角战,希望联盟仍然有很大希望重新执政雪州政府。

    王建民博士
    沙登区国会议员

    [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law

    [1] PAS was part of the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU) coalition with Semangat 46 in 1990 and 1995, the Barisan Alternative in 1999 and 2004 and Pakatan Rakyat after the 2008 general elections.

    [2] The Indian support could not be calculated in all seats because not all seats have a large enough % of Indian voters.

    [1] This was prior to the 2003 delimitation exercise which reconfigured many of the seats which PAS won to make it more difficult for them to retain these seats in the 2004 general elections.

  • Battle for Selangor Part 2

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, MP for Serdang, on the 27th of September, 2017

    Battle for Selangor Part 2

    In Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”, I showed evidence from past elections on how voters in Selangor are very quick to punish what they perceive to be ineffective governments and how they are quick to reward parties which can deliver good governance.

    In Part 2 of the “Battle for Selangor”, I discuss the political circumstances which can limit the amount of damage PAS can do in three corner fights in the upcoming general election.

    A common perception among political observers and analysts is that contests involving BN, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and PAS will likely result in a victory for the BN. The Sungai Besar and Kuala Kangsar by-elections, which were contested by the BN, PAS and AMANAH and which were won by the BN with increased majorities (compared to GE2013) are often used as evidence that three corner fights will be in the BN’s favour.

    I do not dispute that straight fights against the BN would be the ideal situation for the opposition. But I want to use the following three points to show that PH can still win Selangor even in the presence of three corner fights involving PAS.

    (i) The political landscape has changed since the Sungai Besar and Kuala Kangsar by-elections.

    The political stakes for voters in by-elections are not very high. Voters know that they are not deciding the future of a state or federal government. Local issues become more important than state and national issues. Voter turnout is also significantly lower than in general elections. The fact that the BN would perform better in these by-elections is thus not that surprising.

    The political landscape has changed significantly since the two by-elections in June 2016. Back then, BERSATU had not been formed yet. Tun Dr. Mahathir and Tan Sri Muhyiddin had not been sacked by UMNO. PAS had not yet broken off ties with PKR. BERSATU had not yet joined Pakatan Harapan. The Pakatan Harapan leadership line-up had not been established. More than a year after the two by-elections, it is increasingly clear to voters that there are now two distinct and broad-based coalitions which can form the next federal government and the state government in Selangor. PAS does not feature in either coalition.

    In the context of a general election where voters have to choose who forms the next state and federal governments, it would be a mistake to assume that all those voters who supported PAS in past elections would continue to support PAS in the next general election.

    The more we make the next elections a stark choice between supporting a BN government led by a world renowned kleptocrat and a historic opportunity to change to an alternative coalition with a proven track record of governing two states for two terms, the likelier it is that more voters will not want to ‘waste’ their vote on a third-party candidate which has no chance of forming the government at either the state or federal level.

    In general elections prior to 1990, in seats featuring two or more opposition parties, voters never had to face the choice between an opposition coalition that could form the next state or federal government. In a contest featuring BN, DAP and PAS, pro-opposition voters did not have to think of whether DAP or PAS would form the next state or federal government. In GE14, this choice is now available to pro-opposition voters given that there is a real chance that PH could win Putrajaya and very likely retain control of the Selangor state government.

    As such, past assumptions about how voters would vote in a multi-corner fight must be revised.

    (ii) PAS’ political success in Selangor is relatively recent

    One of the reasons political observers tend to overestimate PAS’ overall support in Selangor is because of the 15 state and 4 parliament seats won by PAS in GE13. But they forget that PAS’ electoral success in Selangor is a relatively recent phenomenon.

    According to Table 1 below, PAS did not win a single parliament seat in Selangor from 1990 to 2004. Even in the 1999 Reformasi elections where PAS emerged as the largest opposition party in parliament and won control of the Terengganu state government (and retained the Kelantan state government), it only managed to win 4 state seats in Selangor namely the Sungai Besar state seat in Sabak Bernam, the Sungai Burung state seat in Tanjung Karang, the Gombak Setia state seat in Gombak and the Kajang state seat in Hulu Langat.[1]

    Even in the 2008 and 2013 general elections, PAS only managed to win 52.9% and 54.3% of the popular vote respectively in the parliament seats it contested and 49.5% and 54.9% of the popular vote respectively in the state seats it contested. And as we shall see in the next point, a large proportion of this support was from the non-Malay voters which are likely to abandon PAS in droves in GE14.

    Of course, PAS can respond by saying that DAP and PKR’s electoral success in Selangor is also a relatively recent phenomenon. And they would be right in saying this. The difference is that DAP and PKR are part of a larger political coalition, Pakatan Harapan, which has a legitimate chance of forming the next federal government and are in a strong position to retain the Selangor government. On the other hand, for the first time since 1986, PAS is in a political isolated position (putting aside the stillborn Gagasan Sejahtera coalition) with no chance of forming either the state or federal government on its own.[2]

    (iii) PAS did not win a majority of Malay votes in Selangor in GE2013

    Perhaps the best evidence of PAS’ strength in Selangor can be seen its performance in the 2013 general elections where it won a historic 15 out of the 20 state seats it contested in. Table 3 below shows the estimated level of support for PAS by Malay, Chinese and Indian voters in the 15 state seats it won in GE2013.[3]

    From Table 3, what is clear is that PAS failed to win more than 50% of Malay votes in all except one of the state seats it won (the exception is N26 Bangi). The average Malay support for PAS in the seats it won is approximately 40%. PAS managed to win 14 out of 15 state seats in Selangor in GE2013 because of the high non-Malay support it received – an estimated 88% of Chinese and 68% of Indian support in these seats.

    I would make the argument that PAS Malay support in newly won seats in GE2013 such as Seri Serdang, Paya Jaras and Morib, was largely due to the fact that it was part of a larger opposition coalition rather than because of its grassroot strength and support. Once PAS is no longer part of an opposition coalition, not only would its non-Malay support drop precipitously, I would argue that in many areas, PAS support among the Malay community would also fall.

    Challenge for Pakatan Harapan (PH) in Selangor

    There is a phenomenon that has been documented in political science called Duverger’s law which states that in first past the post single member constituency electoral systems which is used in countries like Malaysia, the United Kingdom and the United States, voters tend to focus their votes on two parties (or two coalitions, in the case of Malaysia).[4] In other words, most voters tend not to want to ‘waste’ their votes on third party candidates because they know that these candidates have little chance of winning the seat. This does not mean that third party candidates will get no votes but that they will get relatively few votes.

    PH can expedite the move towards two coalition competition in Selangor by taking the following steps.

    Firstly, it can and should make it clear to voters that PAS will not be part of the Selangor state government after GE14 regardless of the outcome. This will provide a further incentive for pro-opposition voters to choose PH over PAS especially if they do not want the BN to recapture the Selangor state government.

    Secondly, PH must actively court fence sitters and PAS sympathisers to continue to vote for a PH government in Selangor in GE14. As I’ve argued in Part 1 of the “Battle for Selangor”, many voters in Selangor do not have very strong party loyalties. Many of the voters who voted for PAS in GE13, especially the Malay voters, can be persuaded to switch their votes to another party in PH on the basis that PH can form the next government in Selangor and in Putrajaya.

    Thirdly, PH must focus its attention on comparing and contrasting itself to the BN and not go all out to attack PAS. The main political adversary for PH in Selangor and in other states is still the BN. If PH is too obsessed with attacking PAS, this will inevitably alienate many PAS sympathizers.

    At the end of the day, given Azmin Ali’s popularity as the current Menteri Besar of Selangor, especially among the Malay community, there is no reason why he cannot lead PH in Selangor to a convincing victory in GE14 even if PH has to go up against the BN and PAS in some seats including his own parliamentary seat of Gombak and his state seat of Bukit Antarabangsa.

    In Part 3 of this series, I will show the possible electoral outcomes for GE14 under different assumptions of how many votes PAS can obtain in the context of three corner fights. By showing these results, I hope that I can convince some of the sceptics that despite having 3 corner fights, PH can still regain control of the Selangor state government.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

    [1] This was prior to the 2003 delimitation exercise which reconfigured many of the seats which PAS won to make it more difficult for them to retain these seats in the 2004 general elections.

    [2] PAS was part of the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU) coalition with Semangat 46 in 1990 and 1995, the Barisan Alternative in 1999 and 2004 and Pakatan Rakyat after the 2008 general elections.

    [3] The Indian support could not be calculated in all seats because not all seats have a large enough % of Indian voters.

    [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law

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