Non-resident voters: EC economises with ‘truth’
I have been asked many questions with regard to the 3.1 million potential non-resident voters which I first highlighted at a press conference together with members of the Bersih steering committee on April 23. I subsequently wrote about this issue in greater detail here.
In response to these questions, I would like to make the following points:
1. That not all 3.1 million of these potential non-resident voters are dubious voters.
2. There are many reasons why voters are not registered in the same constituency indicated by their IC address.
3. That one of the reasons is because of politicians registering their supporters in their respective constituencies even though these voters do not and have never lived in these constituencies.
4. A manifestation of this practice is the presence of addresses with many voters registered in them or voters registered without house numbers.
5. That the Election Commission (EC) has decided to move to a new registration system where a new/transferred voter could only be registered in the constituency indicated by his/her IC address.
6. That the EC still refuses to acknowledge the problem of non-resident voters as well as the problem of many non-resident voters being registered in the same address.
7. The example of the locality where Mimos (Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems) ‘misinterpreted’ the electoral data has a large number of newly-registered Kod 71 voters.
8. It is difficult for politicians and the EC to locate voters without house numbers, especially in the urban areas.
Not all are dubious voters but…
I have never said that all these 3.1 million potential non-resident voters are dubious voters.
What I wanted to highlight was that there were 3.1 million voters in Peninsular Malaysia whose IC address did not correspond with their voting constituency and that these voters were identified in a National Registration Department (JPN in BM) project called ‘Projek SPR’.
For those who doubt that I have access to this data, please see screenshots of the 11 CDs representing data for each state (right).
There are many reasons to explain these potential non-resident voters. Table 1 lists three possible reasons according to three categories.
This categorisation is not exhaustive since there are many other permutations and combinations which can be added. The key here is to identify the voters who can be classified as non-resident voters.
Take a case under Category 1. A voter’s hometown is in Ijok, Kuala Selangor. He then moves to Section 16 under the Petaling Jaya Selatan parliamentary constituency in Selangor. He registers as a voter here but his IC address still remains in Ijok. This voter is a resident voter.
This is the example which describes Selangor Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim whose IC address is in Ijok but whose voting constituency was in Petaling Jaya Selatan (now transferred to Lembah Pantai after the EC’s boundary correction exercise).
Take a case under Category 2. A voter’s hometown is in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. He registers as a voter in the Kota Bharu parliamentary seat. He then moves to Bangi, Selangor. He changes his IC address to Bangi. But he maintains his voting constituency in his hometown seat of Kota Bharu. This voter is a resident voter.
Voters in categories 1 and 2 are considered resident voters because they were residents in their respective constituencies at the time of their registration as voters. Even if they have subsequently moved away from these constituencies, they are still considered as resident voters as per Article 119 of the Federal Constitution.
Please note that voters who have moved from one place to another but still maintains their IC address and voting constituency in their hometowns are not included among the 3.1 million non-resident voters identified by JPN. For example, the ‘Project SPR’ databases do not include the many Kelantanese who have moved to the Bangi area but whose IC address and voting constituencies are still in Kelantan.
Hence, it would be wrong, as this blogger has done, to say that we should not be concerned about this 3.1 million voters because there were still 1.1 million Malaysians who were still holding on to their old Malaysian ICs in 2005 or the fact that there were 3.6 million intra-state migrants according to the 2000 population.
The 1.1 million Malaysians who still had old ICs in 2005 would not have been included among the 3.1 million if their IC address was the same their voting constituency.
Just because one upgrades from the old IC to a new IC does not mean that the person’s IC address would have changed. In addition, some of the 3.6 million intra-state migrants in 2000 would have maintained their voting constituency according to their IC address. Just because they have moved, does not mean that they would have changed their voting constituency or their IC address.
Inter- and intra-state migration certainly increases the complexity in defining and understanding the problem of non-resident and resident voters and I appreciate the efforts of this blogger for pointing it out.
However, it is voters in category 3 which I am most concerned about since these are non-resident voters who have never lived in the constituencies they were registered in 2002 when the Project SPR exercise was completed. Those in category 3 are those which I would define as dubious voters.
If it wasn’t broke, why fix it?
It was widely acknowledge that political parties and politicians on both sides of the political divide were responsible for registering supporters in their own constituencies so as to boost their chances of retaining or winning these constituencies even though these voters did not live in these constituencies.
Standards of ‘proving’ that a voter who wanted to register in a particular constituency actually lived in that constituency were rather lax. Some sort of bill (telephone, electricity) of a person’s name and address was all that was required.
In many cases, even this requirement was waived. There are also many voters who were allowed to register without indicating their house number even though they were registered in urban areas.
The EC themselves tacitly acknowledged this problem when it decided to move to a new registration system where a voter could only be registered at constituency indicated by his or her IC address. After all, if the previous system was working fine, why change the registration criteria in 2002?
The results of ‘Projek SPR’ which was carried out by JPN prior to the change of the registration system in 2002 validated these concerns since it revealed that as many as 37% (3.1 million out of 8.2 million) voters in Peninsular Malaysia at that time had IC addresses that was different from the voting constituencies.
Even if a third of these voters were dubious voters, i.e. those in Category 3 in Table 1 above, it would mean that one million voters were registered in constituencies which they have never lived in.
Without a further audit, we simply do not know the percentage of voters according to the different categories listed in Table 1. To my knowledge, the EC has never tried to find out, even after being given this data by the JPN back in 2002.
Many voters in one address
A clear manifestation of the problem of non-resident voters is the presence of house addresses with many registered voters since politicians – before 2002, when there was less detailed scrutiny on the electoral roll – would regularly register their supporters in a limited number of addresses in their respective constituencies.
As a result some of these houses have Malay, Chinese and Indian registered voters who in all likelihood do not even know of each other’s existence. In some cases, some of these voters were not even allocated a house number but was registered using a street name.
What is both sad and troubling is the fact that the EC has never done anything, at least publicly, to find out the extent of this problem, much less do something about it. It is not rocket science.
Anyone armed with even a rudimentary command of Excel could go through an electoral roll and highlight houses with more than X number of voters registered in them.
Mimos was asked to identify possible problems in the electoral roll as part of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reform. Their analysis revealed 324 addresses with more than 100 voters and another 938 addresses with between 51 to 100 addresses.
The PSC recommended that the EC publishes the names of all of the voters in these addresses so that these voters can step forward to verify their identity and for the EC to report back, in 45 days, to a specially set up parliamentary select committee which will oversee the cleaning up of the electoral roll.
What was the EC’s response? In a booklet entitled ‘The Truth Behind the Accusations and Lies towards the Election Commission’ (henceforth referred to as ‘The Truth’), under Allegation 6, the EC responded by saying that Mimos “had misunderstood the large number of electors in a locality, so as to mean that all the electors in that locality are registered under one address”.
The example given by the EC was the locality of Kampung Melayu Majidee in the parliament seat of Johor Bahru, which was assumed to have just one address with more than 50 voters. The EC said that “In reality, this locality has tens of complete addresses, as well as incomplete addresses that have all been combined to form a locality.”
What is stated by the EC is technically correct. When examining in Quarter 3 (Q3) 2011 electoral roll, I found 96 names in the locality named “Kg Melayu Majidee” (Locality Code: 1604407014). 74 of these voters had complete addresses, 22 others did not.
In Table 2, I show 30 voters from this locality with complete house addresses, including house numbers.
Foreigners in the house?
At the same time, I also found a list of 22 names in the same locality which did not have any house numbers in the same locality. (See Table 3 below)
A few points of concern immediately jumps out when comparing Tables 2 and 3.
Firstly, there are indeed many identifiable roads in this particular locality, according to Table 2. If this area is relatively developed and it should be since it is in the Johor Bahru constituency, then one wonders why is it that there are no roads as well as house numbers attached to the voters in Table 3.
Secondly, the voters without any house numbers in Table 3 were all registered in May and June 2011. One would have assumed that their ICs would give the full address of these voters given that this place is in the urbanised seat of Johor Bahru.
Thirdly, and more disconcerting, all of the voters in Table 3 have Kod 71 in their ICs indicating that they were not born in Malaysia. (Looking at their names, it is likely that they are of Indonesian ‘heritage’ e.g. Nur’asiyah). By contrast, note that none of the voters in Table 2 have Kod 71 in their ICs.
Having aroused my suspicion, I then proceeded to examine newly-registered voters for this specific locality for Q4 2011 and Q1 2012. The results are show below in Table 4 and 5.
According to Table 4 (above), there a total of 32 voters were in the Q4 2011 electoral roll update in this locality. Of these 32 voters, 30 were newly-registered voters and all of them do not have house addresses and all of them have Kod 71 in their ICs.
The only voter with a house address (No 24) was taken off this electoral roll because she has moved to another constituency. The only non-Kod 71 voter added to the electoral roll is not a newly-registered voter but who move to this voting constituency.
According to Table 5 (above), there were six newly-registered voters in this locality in the Q1 2012 electoral roll update. Two voters, both of whom are not Kod 71 voters, have house numbers. The other four voters, who are Kod 71 voters, all do not have house addresses.
To recap, what we have in this locality, which was highlighted in the EC’s recent booklet to tell “the truth”, is a situation, as for Q1 2012, where of the 134 registered voters in this locality, 74 voters have complete addresses (house numbers and street names), none of whom are Kod 71 voters, while the remaining 57 voters do not have house numbers or even street names and all except one are Kod 71 voters who have been newly registered in the past one year.
The EC, rather than giving reasons on why Mimos had misinterpreted the electoral roll data, should be extremely concerned that Mimos found more than 50 names in this locality without house addresses in an urban locality.
What is more, they should have done exactly what I did here, which was to examine the voters who did not have house numbers and would have found that all of them were recently registered and with Kod 71 in their ICs.
This should have prompted them to do a serious audit in this area to determine if the ICs of these voters have been legitimately issued and why so many of them are staying in one locality without any house number. Instead, the EC choose to look the other way by giving excuses.
This is just one locality. What about the other 1,261 localities with more than 50 registered voters? What would we find if the EC reveals what these localities are?
Locating voters without house numbers
The EC may be right in saying that there are voters who live in kampongs who do not have house addresses. But there are probably as many voters who live in semi-urban and urban areas where there are house numbers for each locality or street, but whose details do not show any house numbers.
What this means it is very difficult for a candidate who is running for office or an incumbent MP or Adun (state assemblyperson) to identify these voters to ascertain if they are indeed resident voters (or were resident voters).
For example, 22 voters from a locality in urban Petaling Jaya Utara (Locality Name: Jalan 1 Kg Bahru, Sg Way (Jalan 1-25), Locality Code: 1063510001) are shown in Table 6 below. All of them do not have house numbers and all of them were registered before 2002.
Malays, Chinese and Indians are all represented in this list of voters. Without the house numbers, how is one supposed to locate these voters?
If someone wants to object to the inclusion of some of these voters into the electoral roll during the quarterly updates (for newly-registered voters without house addresses), how will the EC send letters to these voters so that they can turn up to during the verification hearing?
These technical but important questions were not answered by the EC in their ‘truth’ booklet.
Tip of the iceberg
To recap, I started this article by pointing out that not all of the 3.1 million potential non-resident voters are dubious voters. Under the previous voter registration, it was relatively easy to register non-resident as voters and that even if one-third of these 3.1 million voters are non-resident, it would constitute one million voters.
One manifestation of non-resident voters can be found in houses with many registered voters (10 is usually a good cut-off point) or urban and semi-urban localities with many voters without house addresses.
The EC thought that this problem could be reduced by forcing everyone to register under their IC address. This change was introduced in 2002. But even after this change, the ‘legacy’ issue of non-resident voters has not been resolved as seen by the voters without house addresses in one locality in Petaling Jaya Utara in Table 6.
More worryingly, in the locality which the EC used as an example of how Mimos ‘misinterpreted’ the electoral roll data, 55 out of 57 newly registered voters since May 2011 did not have house addresses and 54 out of these 55 voters had the Kod 71 in their IC numbers, indicating that they were not born in Malaysia.
This may just be the tip of the iceberg. If the EC is willing to release the names of the other 1,261 localities with more than 50 registered voters, my team at the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (Merap) are more than willing to analyse these localities and present the results for public consumption.
ONG KIAN MING is the project director of the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (Merap) and a lecturer and political analyst at UCSI University.
This article was published by Malaysiakini.
Book Review – PKFZ: A Nation’s Trust Betrayed
Which is the biggest financial scandal in Malaysian history, someone recently asked me. Without hesitation, I replied, Port Klang Free Zone or PKFZ. This scandal could potentially end up costing the Malaysian taxpayer RM12.5 billion according to the PWC position review report. In real terms, the financial losses associated with PKFZ may be slightly less than the BMF scandal (RM2.5b in 1983), the Maminco scandal (RM1.6b, 1980s) and Perwaja (RM10b in accumulated losses, 1990s) but none of these scandals can challenge PKFZ in terms of financial creativity and the number of high profile politicians involved.
The breadth and scope of this scandal is revealed in all its ‘glory’ in former Port Klang Authority (PKA) chairman and Subang Jaya state assemblyman Dato’ Lee Hwa Beng’s book – PKFZ: A Nation’s Trust Betrayed, written with former journalist Lee Siew Lian.
The contribution of this book can be found in four areas.
Firstly, it provides an insider’s account of what caused this seemingly well conceived project – to replicate the success of the Jebel Ali Free Zone in Dubai – to turn into the financial fiasco we now known as PKFZ. As the former PKA chairman brought in to clean up the mess, as a professional accountant and as a former politician, Lee knew where to look for the skeletons in the cupboard, so to speak. And with access to the full reports involving this case, he knows exactly what pertinent information needs to be recorded for the sake of posterity including details on key events and personalities.
Secondly, with the able help of his co-author, Lee Siew Lian, Lee is able to piece together all the relevant information in a manner that is relatively easy to understand, especially given the complexity of this case. Here, the various timelines associated with the complicated land sale, firstly from the UMNO controlled Koperasi Pembagunan Pulau Lumut Bhd (KPPLB) to Kuala Dimensi Dimensi Sdn Bhd (KDSB), then controlled by Bintulu MP, Tiong King Sing, and then from KDSB to PKA, are particularly useful as are the timelines associated with the letters of support issued by former transport Ministers, Tun Ling Liong Sik and Dato’ Seri Chan Kong Choy in conjunction with the signing of the agreements and issuing of bonds at various stages to build the PKFZ infrastructure with KDSB.
The timelines, together with the financial information highlighted, reveal how PKA was seemingly ‘duped’ not just once or twice but many times by KDSB. PKA not only paid above market rates for the PKFZ land but was also charged above market interest rates for the deferred payments.
PKA was further ‘duped’ into paying for the development of the whole parcel of land in a single stage rather than the more financially prudent option of developing the project in stages. Time and time again, KDSB, the party who sold the PKFZ land to PKA, was appointed as the main contractor for an ever expanding scope of development work, without any open tenders. PKA would end up owing KDSB RM4.9 billion, which includes the land as well as development costs, almost 5 times more than the estimated RM1 billion debt level that was deemed sustainable for PKA.
Thirdly, this book is instrumental in highlighting the exact roles and degree of responsibility of the key players in this grand saga. Given that PKA came under the MCA controlled Ministry of Transportation, it was not surprising that many MCA leaders were named. I was particularly intrigued by episodes documenting Tun Ling’s insistence on buying the land from KDSB instead of the cheaper option of the Federal Government acquiring that piece of land, which was also the preferred option of the Ministry of Finance.
Other than the two former Ministers of Transportation who are being charged in court, the potential conflict of interest involving Dato’ Chor Chee Heung, the current Minister of Housing and Local Government, who was both PKA chairman as well as a non-independent director of KDSB’s sister company, Wijaya, for a period of 4 months was also highlighted.
The potential conflict of interest involving the then speaker of the Selangor state assembly, Dato’ Onn Ismail in holding the post of chairman of KPPLB while he was the speaker as well as that of Sementa assemblyman, Dato’ Rahman Pahlil, who took over as the chairman of KPPLB and was later appointed as a PKA director are also highlighted.
Not all of the names mentioned in this book played negative roles. The support which was given to Lee by former MCA president and Minister of Transportation, Dato’ Seri Ong Tee Keat, despite the pressure put on Ong by the cabinet, was emphasized at various junctures in the book. Lee also credited four DAP politicians – Lim Kit Siang, Ronnie Liu, Teng Chang Kim and Tony Pua – for the roles they played in highlighting the improprieties associated with this case at different points in time.
Perhaps more important than all the information revealed is the fact that there are still many issues left to be resolved, which is this book’s fourth contribution. For example, the contents of the Skrine Task Force report to turn around PKFZ, which was given to Prime Minister Najib, has not been publicly revealed. The Special Task Force on this scandal, headed by the Chief Secretary to the government, has had no public announcements since its formation in 2009. PKA continues to pay KDSB so that it can pay its bondholders despite the fact that there are outstanding lawsuits by PKA taken out against KDSB. There are also recent allegations that PKA has decided to drop these lawsuits against KDSB as well as its decision to withdraw a complaint made against Rashid Asari & Co to the Bar Council, over potential conflict of interest in the legal firm’s role in acting for both KDSB as well as PKA in the PKFZ land sale. The publication of this book comes at an appropriate time, given that interest in this scandal seemed to have waned as public attention has moved elsewhere. It is a timely reminder that the taxpayer is still on the hook for the mounting losses of PKA and that many of those involved in this case have yet to be charged or convicted.
If I had any criticism of this book it would be the fact that it badly needs a list of references as well as proper labelling of the various timelines and shareholding arrangements. It would make it much easier for researchers and even the casual reader to find the relevant information after the first reading of what is a forensic and creative accounting page turner.
I have no doubt that there is other relevant information which Lee has access to which he still has not revealed, perhaps to avoid getting sued and also because of the on-going trials of Ling and Chan. I would be the first in line if he is ever to publish a follow up book revealing new information on this scandal that threatens to be the biggest in Malaysian history. In the meantime, I recommend all taxpayers, current and future, to read about how part of your hard earned tax dollars is being spent.
* Ong Kian Ming holds a PhD in political science from Duke University. He is currently a lecturer and political scientist at UCSI University.
EC has not been honest in its rebuttals
Bersih 3.0 may have been a success in terms of its ability to attract more than 100,000 Malaysians from all walks of life to come out in support of clean and fair elections but the hard work of ensuring that this aspiration is translated into reality needs to continue.
All the more so when the Election Commission continues to ignore the many problems highlighted by the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (Merap) with regard to the electoral roll.
The EC has recently published a booklet with 12 points of rebuttal against allegations that the electoral roll is full of problematic registrations and that the EC has been complicit in not cleaning up the electoral roll.
In this article, I want to highlight two of the rebuttals to illustrate that the EC has not been honest in its responses which reflects its inconsistent policies in managing the electoral roll and electoral boundaries.
EC’s boundary ‘correction’ exercise
One of the EC’s rebuttals is that it has not redrawn any electoral boundaries since such an exercise would require parliamentary approval. What the EC has been doing instead, is to correct previous errors of putting voters in certain localities in the wrong parliamentary and state constituency.
This was done after the introduction of a new Electoral Geographic Information System (Egis) in 2004. The EC used the power given to the chief registrar under the Section 25(3) of the Elections (Regulation of Electors) Regulations 2002 where it is state that:
“Where an error has resulted in any person being registered as an elector of a registration area which is not a registration area in respect of which that person should have been registered, the Chief Registrar may enter that person’s name in the principal electoral roll or the supplementary electoral roll for the appropriate registration area.”
This was the reason given for why Selangor Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim’s voting area was shifted from Petaling Jaya Selatan (P105) to Lembah Pantai (P121) – Section 16/2 is part of Wilayah Persekutuan rather than Petaling Jaya.
The ‘correction of boundaries’ according to the EC has affected 19,342 voters in the whole country.
I have three concerns with regard to the EC’s rebuttal on this point.
Firstly, if the Egis system was introduced in 2004 after the 2003 delimitation exercise, why were these corrections not done until long after the 2008 general elections?
The following is the EC’s statement in Bahasa Malaysia with regard to the introduction of the Egis system:
“SPR menyedari kedudukan beberapa lokaliti yang tersalah letak di dalam bahagian pilihan raya hanya selepas Sistem Egis (Electoral Geographical Information System) digunapakai dalam tahun 2004.”
And again, when referring to the correction to the Section 16/2 locality and shifting it from PJ Selatan to Lembah Pantai:
“Apabila sistem Egis (Electoral Geographical Information System) dilaksanakan pada tahun 2004, SPR mula menyedari kesilapan penentuan kedudukan lokaliti berkenaan.”
The fact that the EC only choose to make these boundary ‘corrections’ more than four years (after the 2008 general election) after the introduction of Egis is very troubling and concerning.
Affected voters not informed
Secondly, what is more troubling is the fact that the EC did not notify the 19,342 voters which were affected by this exercise. They only wrote to the political areas in the areas which were affected.
Again, this raises concerns in regard to the intent of the EC to keep voters informed about their respective voting constituencies. Is it the responsibility of the politicians or is it the responsibility of the EC to keep voters informed of the changes made?
Most reasonable people would argue that the EC has the obligation to inform voters when they have been shifted from one voting constituency to another since this means that their political representative at the state (for the non-Federal Territories voters) and at the parliamentary levels have been changed.
The EC has since stated that it would send letters to each of these voters to inform them of these changes before the next general election. We hope that these letters will be sent in a timely fashion and that all of these affected voters will be duly notified.
Thirdly, the EC has not been consistent and transparent in this boundary ‘correction’ exercise.
When they informed political representatives that localities have been shifted in and/or out of their respective constituencies, they failed to provide updated maps of the newly configured constituencies showing exactly where the new localities are placed.
This lack of transparency points to the possibility that the EC has not been transparent in terms of the standards used for these boundary ‘correction’ exercises.
I shall firstly illustrate one case involving the movement of localities which does not make sense according to pre-existing electoral boundaries in the state seats of Seri Setia (Kelana Jaya parliament) and Kota Damansara (Subang).
Map 1 below highlights one of the areas affected by this boundary ‘correction’ exercise in the state seat of Seri Setia (N32).
Map 2 below highlights the localities which have been transferred from Seri Setia to Kota Damansara (N39).
The electoral boundary of Seri Setia is demarcated by the major highways highlighted in red. This is the pre-existing boundary which was used in the 2004 and 2008 general elections.
What is perplexing is that Saujana Resort, which lies on the southern side of the old Subang airport road (highlighted in red at the top of the map) has now been shifted to Kota Damansara, which lies on the northern side of the old Subang airport road.
I fail to see why Egis would show that this locality should be shifted to another constituency when it clearly falls within the boundary of the Seri Setia state seat.
What is also perplexing is that two localities that are to the east of the Jalan Monfort highway boundary (highlighted in red at the left of the map) – Pusat Bekalan Polis Shah Alam and Pangsapuri Melewar – have also been shifted to Kota Damansara.
If the EC had shifted these two localities to Kota Anggerik (N40), it could have at least been more defensible. It does not make sense for these two localities to be moved up to Kota Damansara when the Taman Glenmarie locality, which is closer to the Kota Damansara seat, remains in Seri Setia.
This is just one example of how the boundary ‘correction’ exercise done by the EC does not seem to be using consistent and transparent standards which includes using natural boundaries like rivers and other man-made boundaries such as major roads to demarcate constituencies.
Another example which shows the EC inconsistency in adopting a consistent set of standards in its boundary ‘correction’ exercise is the inclusion of a locality in Bukit Jalil, which should be under the Bandar Tun Razak parliamentary seat, not the Lembah Pantai parliamentary seat.
A new locality called POLIS (Pusat Tahanan Sementara Bukit Jalil – Kod Lokaliti: 1210017701) was created in 2011. As its name indicates, this police holding facility is located in Bukit Jalil.
But the almost 500 police postal voters in this locality were allocated to the Lembah Pantai parliamentary constituency, a marginal constituency which is likely to be contested by Federal Territories Minister Raja Nong Chik.
The EC would be hard pressed to explain why its boundary ‘correction’ exercise failed to put this locality into the Bandar Tun Razak parliamentary constituency, especially since it falls outside the current boundaries of the Lembah Paintai parliamentary seat.
To ensure that this boundary ‘correction’ exercise is not a stealth delimitation exercise, the EC should publish maps of the areas affected indicating clearly the localities which have been shifted as well as why they have been shifted.
42,051 doubtful voters in electoral roll
After initially promising to erase 42,051 voters whose information and status was not clear according to the National Registration Department (NRD) records, the EC retracted on this and said that they had no right to remove these names even though Section 25 2(g) of the Elections (Regulation of Electors) Regulations 2002 states that the chief registrar may “strik(e) out the name of any person who, in the opinion of the Chief Registrar, is not entitled, for any reason, to remain or be in the principal electoral roll or the supplementary roll”.
This figure was later revised downwards by 1,248 voters to 40,803 when these names publicly displayed and the NRD was able to update their records accordingly.
However, the EC has failed to account for why 14,577 names were deleted in the Quarter 2 2011 because their records were not active in NRD – “rekod tidak aktif di JPN (NRD)”. Not that these names were not deleted because the voters in question had died – that figure was reported in a separate category.
Hence, if in one quarter, the names of almost 15,000 voters were deleted because their NRD records were not active, why was it the case that over 42,000 voters whose status was not identifiable by the NRD in another quarter not dealt with in the same manner?
Again, this calls into question the EC’s consistency in applying the same standards for the same cases.
What is also disconcerting is the fact that a very high percentage of the voters among the 42,051 not deleted as well as the 14,577 deleted voters were very old voters. For example, 13,183 or 90.4 percent of the 14,577 deleted voters were over the age of 70. Similarly, 33,421 or 79.5 percent of the 42,051 not deleted voters were above the age of 70.
It also raises questions about the utility of publicly displaying these records when most of the voters among the 42,051 are probably not very mobile and would not be able to ‘verify’ the fact that they are still very much alive. And if they are dead and do not have family who happen upon this list, then there is no way that their names can be removed from the electoral roll.
It would be much more effective for the EC to form investigative teams, together with NRD, to try to track down as many of these voters as possible instead of just relying on public displays and relying on politicians and political parties to track down these voters.
As long as the EC is not pro-active in ‘going to the ground’, the list of ‘dubious’ voters, including those who are aged over 100 years old, will continue to populate the electoral roll. The identity of these voters can easily be used by irresponsible parties to cast a vote.
Dr ONG KIAN MING is project director of the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (Merap).
This article was published by Malaysiakini.
Electoral roll: What else is the EC hiding?
In two previous articles, I highlighted 10 problems associated with the electoral roll as part of the preliminary findings of the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (Merap), a research effort to identify and understand problems with the existing electoral roll.
Firstly, approximately 3.1 million voters were identified as potential non-resident voters by the National Registration Department (NRD) in 2002. This data was given by NRD to the Election Commission (EC) but no action was taken by the EC to assess the magnitude of this problem and to identify ways to rectify it.
Secondly, using the EC’s own data which lists the nationality or ‘bangsa’ of each voter, approximately 65,000 voters were identified as having foreign nationalities. Of these, close to 90 percent or 58,000 had IC numbers which indicate that they were born in Malaysia.
In addition, approximately 49,000 of these voters came from one state alone – Sabah – which has a well-documented history where ICs were given to illegal immigrants in order to allow them to register as voters.
Thirdly, by comparing the electoral rolls in Quarter 4 (Q4) 2010 and Quarter 3 (Q3) 2011 and by cross-checking them with the quarterly updates in the first to third quarters in 2011, it was found that there were 106,743 voters removed from the electoral roll without public display and another 6,762 voters added to the electoral roll during the same period, also without public display.
Fourthly, important information provided by the EC in the Q1 to Q3 2011 quarterly roll updates such as the reasons for the deletion of names from the electoral roll were omitted in the Q4 2011 quarterly roll. This omission immediately raises concerns about the possibility of concealing important information by the EC in order to prevent detailed analysis from being conducted.
Adding the figures which I found from the initial preliminary analysis to the figures highlighted in this article, I have identified approximately 3.4 million cases where further investigation needs to be conducted by the EC in order to verify the legitimacy of these voters because this is the pool of problematic registrations that currently tars the integrity and accuracy of the electoral roll.
1) 3.1 million potential non-resident voters
In 2002, the information systems section of the NRD (Bahagian Perkhidmatan Sistem Maklumat) conducted an exercise called Projek SPR where the IC addresses of all voters in Peninsular Malaysia were compared with the voting constituencies of these voters.
The main purpose behind this project was to identify all the voters whose IC addresses did not correspond to the constituencies that these voters were registered in.
For example, if a person’s IC address was somewhere in Bukit Gasing in Petaling Jaya, which is located in the PJ Selatan parliamentary constituency but if this person is registered as a voter in the Shah Alam parliamentary constituency, then this voter would be classified as a potential non-resident voter (pengundi luar kawasan).
A total of 3,082,482 million voters were identified as potential non-resident voters, meaning that their IC addresses did not correspond with their voting constituencies. This constituted 37 perrcent of the then 8.3 million voters in Peninsular Malaysia in 2002.
Of course, not all of these 3.1 million voters are non-resident voters. For example, a person’s IC address may be that of his parent’s home in Bukit Gasing, but he may be currently residing in a house in Shah Alam and registered as a voter in that constituency.
Article 119 (1) of the Federal Constitution states that “Every citizen who (a) has attained the age of twenty-one years on the qualifying date; and (b) is resident in a constituency on such qualifying date or, if not so resident, is an absent voter, is entitled to vote in that constituency in any election to the House of Representatives or the Legislative Assembly…”
This means that only those who are residents in a particular constituency when they register as voters are qualified to vote in that particular constituency.
The presence of such a large number of voters whose IC addresses do not correspond with their voting constituencies clearly shows that the problem of non-resident voters is a serious one, even if only a small proportion of these 3.1 million voters were not residents in these constituencies at the time of their registration.
The possibility of these voters not being resident voters is further enhanced when one considers the lax standards required before 2002 in order to ‘qualify’ as a resident of a constituency. All someone needed to do prior to 2002 was to show some sort of proof that he was a resident in a particular area – an electricity or phone bill for example.
A number of politicians whom I interviewed on an informal basis told me that the requirement for this proof of residency was often waived. This meant that many strategic politicians could pad their respective constituencies with supporters, friends and family, even though they did not live in that constituency.
One manifestation of this voter padding exercise is the presence of houses with a large number of registered voters.
According to analysis done by Mimos (Malaysian Institute Of Microelectronic Systems), as instructed by the parliamentary select committee on Electoral Reform, 938 houses with between 51 and 100 registered voters each and 523 houses with more than 100 registered voters were identified in the most recent electoral roll.
If we include the 2,071 houses with between 21 and 50 registered voters each and the 3,949 houses with between 11 and 20 registered voters, there are approximately 260,000 voters who are registered in houses with 11 or more registered voters.
And this excludes localities with no house addresses (kampung or longhouses, for example). This is a legacy system left behind by the pre-2002 electoral roll where non-resident voters were registered in addresses that they did not live in.
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this NRD analysis is that the EC, as far as we know, made no effort to identify the magnitude of this problem – how many of these voters were actually non-resident voters – nor did the EC seem to take any measure in order to rectify this problem in the pre-2002 electoral roll.
2) 65,000 ‘foreigners’ in the electoral roll
The EC collects comprehensive data on the ‘bangsa’ or nationality of individual voters. This data is not distributed to political parties, not officially at least, but contains valuable information that can be used to identify problematic registrations.
Table 2 below lists the nationalities which I classified as ‘foreign’. I then extracted all the voters from the Q3 2011 electoral roll which were categorised as belonging to either one of these nationalities or ‘bangsa’.
I identified approximately 65,000 ‘foreigners’ on the Q3 2011 electoral roll using this list of ‘foreign’ nationalities. Out of these 65,000 voters, I found that approximately 58,000 or 90 percent had IC numbers which indicated that they were born in one of the states in Malaysia.
This was quite unexpected, since I presumed that most of these foreigners would have IC numbers which would indicate that they were born outside Malaysia rather than in Malaysia.
After all, if we met 10 random ‘Italians’ who are Malaysian citizens, wouldn’t we expect most of them to be born outside Malaysia and subsequently became naturalised Malaysian citizens? Instead, we find the opposite phenomenon, whereby a majority of these foreign voters are born in Malaysia instead.
More worrying is the fact that approximately 49,000 voters out of 65,000 are foreign voters, or 75 percent, and they are in Sabah, where cases of illegal immigrants being given Malaysian ICs has been well-documented.
Out of these 49,000 foreigners in Sabah, almost 48,000 or 97 percent are ‘Malaysian born’.
Table 3 below shows the distribution of these 65,000 foreigners by state and the number and percentage of these voters with IC numbers that indicate that they were born in Malaysia.
Armed with this kind of information, the EC can easily do an audit of these foreign voters in Sabah, perhaps in cooperation with NRD, to verify if their identities are indeed legitimate and that they are resident voters. As it is, the presence of these voters and the high percentage of them who are Malaysian-born certainly raise serious concerns.
3) Mysterious deletions and additions
In every quarterly update of the electoral roll (Rang Daftar Pemilih Tambahan, or RDPT), the names of those who are newly registered voters, those who have changed their addresses and those whose names have been deleted from the electoral roll in a constituency have to be publicly displayed in a location within that constituency, usually in a government building.
The number of voters who have been added and deleted from the gazetted electoral roll before and after this public display and after the possible objections to the inclusion and the exclusion of some names must add up.
For example, if the gazetted roll had 10,000 voters before the quarterly update, during which 1,000 voters were added and 500 voters were deleted, the gazetted roll after public display should contain 10,500 voters.
My team of researchers compared the number of voters in the Q4 2010 with the Q3 2011 electoral roll and cross checked the numbers with the Q1, Q2 and Q3 2011 electoral roll updates. What we found was that 106,743 voters in the Q4 2010 electoral roll no longer appeared in the Q3 2011 electoral roll and also did not appear in the Q1 to Q3 2011 electoral updates as deleted voters.
This means that they were deleted from the electoral roll without public display. In addition, we found that 6,762 new voters were found in the Q3 2011 electoral roll but these new voters did not appear in any of the quarterly updates in 2011, meaning that these voters were added without public display!
The presence of such a high number of cases of additions and deletions without public display raises doubts as to whether these voters were removed or added under suspicious circumstances. It also raises questions about the number of voters that were removed/added without public display in the quarters prior to 2011.
4) Information on deletion of voters missing
The data given by the EC to the political parties for the Q1 to Q3 2011 quarterly updates had detailed information with regard to the reasons as to why a voter was deleted from the electoral roll.
These reasons include: death, change of address, having joined the police or army, losing one’s citizenship, losing the status of being a postal voter and doubtful identities, just to name a few.
Tables 4 to 6 below show the number of voters added and deleted and the reasons for these deletions for the Q1 to Q3 2011 electoral roll updates.
But all of a sudden, the reasons as to why voters were deleted from the electoral roll were no longer included in the Q4 2011 electoral roll update.
What is more shocking is no voter was listed as being deleted as a result of death. The only data given is the number of voters who were deleted from the Q4 2011 electoral roll as a result of a change in address.
The summary of the Q4 2011 electoral roll update are given in Table 7 below.
One cannot help but wonder if the EC wanted to exclude the voters who had been deleted from the electoral roll because of the intense scrutiny given to the earlier Q1 to Q3 2011 electoral roll updates.
For example, the 42,051 voters whose identity was questionable because of their details could not be verified in the NRD database was revealed in the Q3 2011 update (highlighted in yellow in Table 6 above).
In addition, the sudden increase in the number of deletions in Q3 2011 because of voters entering into the army/police force (highlighted in blue in Table 6 above) also may have drawn unwanted attention as to where these new army/police postal voters were being transferred to.
In-depth audit of electoral roll needed
The data shown in this article raises many concerns about the EC’s desire to ensure a clean, accurate and transparent electoral roll.
The EC has clearly failed to act on important data with regard to problematic registrations that were handed over to it by NRD back in 2002 – the 3.1 million potential non-resident voters – and also data that it collected on its own – the 65,000 foreign voters in the Q3 2011 electoral roll.
In addition, the EC seems to have concealed important data from public knowledge, such as the nationality or ‘bangsa’ of the individual voters, deleting and adding voters without public display and excluding the reasons why voters were deleted from the electoral roll.
The EC should conduct an in-depth audit of the electoral roll, including further investigations into selected samples, and then consider various solutions to these problems, including automatic registration of all voters according to their IC addresses.
With the presence of these problems in the electoral roll, it is clear that the EC chairman’s claim that Malaysia has world’s cleanest electoral roll is one that is not based on reality or facts.
ONG KIAN MING holds a PhD in Political Science from Duke University. He is a lecturer and political analyst at UCSI University. He is also the project director of the Malaysian Electoral Roll Analysis Project (MERAP).
This article was published by Malaysiakini.