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Will other nefarious ways be used by the Election Commission (EC) or the Prime Minister to pass an unfair Selangor delimitation plan?

Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Member of Parliament for Serdang and Assistant National Director for Political Education, on the 18th of January 2018

Will other nefarious ways be used by the Election Commission (EC) or the Prime Minister to pass an unfair Selangor delimitation plan?

Even though the 2nd Notice (Syor 2) of the Delimitation Exercise in Selangor did nothing to make the number of voters in the parliament and state seats approximately equal[1] and even though the Election Commission (EC) was guilty of ethnic gerrymandering in a number of state seats in Syor 2[2], it was still somewhat surprising that the EC reverted to the electoral boundaries used in the 13th general election for most of the seats in Selangor. This raises the question of what motivated the EC to do so?

Is it possible that the EC actually took into account some of the viewpoints of the objectors who presented their views in the public hearing after the 1st Notice (Syor 1)? I am sceptical of this viewpoint because many of the complaints highlighted the differences in the number of voters between state and parliament seats under Syor 1. The EC would have followed up on these complaints by equalizing the number of voters between the Seri Serdang (74,563 voters) and Kinrara (34,910 voters) state seats (both of which are under the Puchong parliament seat), for example. But the EC chose to maintain the GE13 borders of both state seats and allow this discrepancy to continue to exist.

Given that the EC has a very poor record of responding positively to feedback from the public and opposition politicians (and most of the objections were filed / organized by opposition politicians), there must be other reasons behind the EC’s partial U-turn in Selangor.

One possibility is that the EC is concerned that a court case filed by either the Selangor state government or by a voter in Selangor will delay the delimitation exercise in Selangor (and hence the entire delimitation exercise for Peninsular Malaysia) if it maintains the boundaries proposed in Syor 1. The act by the EC to increase the size of discrepancies in the number of voters between parliament and state seats was too obvious and subject to legal challenge. The Selangor state government could pursue a fresh injunction against Syor 2 or it could be successful in its appeal in the Court of Appeal against Syor 1. The EC wanted to pre-empt this by reverting back, mostly, to the GE13 boundaries for most of the seats, especially for the more egregious cases involving the PJ Utara and PJ Selatan parliament seats.

The EC may feel that this ‘price’ is worth paying i.e. maintaining most of the boundaries in Selangor because the delimitation exercise in other states in Peninsular Malaysia has delivered sufficient electoral advantages to the BN. This would be my most ‘generous’ reading of the EC’s strategy.

Of course, this does not mean that the proposals presented in Syor 2 are final. The EC may be hoping that that opposition parties will be complacent and not file in any objections against Syor 2 because the boundaries from GE13 have largely been maintained. If the opposition parties do not file in many objections but if the BN parties organize themselves and file objections to Syor 2 and ask for the boundaries proposed in Syor 1 to be restored, the EC may take the opportunity to shift the boundaries back to what was proposed in Syor 1 before submitting the entire delimitation plan to the PM.

Even if very few objections are filed against Syor 2 in Selangor, the EC still can unilaterally revert back to the boundaries proposed in Syor 1. This, of course, would mean that the EC is acting in very bad faith. But the problem for the opposition is that the final delimitation exercise would not be publicly revealed until it is tabled in parliament in the upcoming March / April 2018 sitting. By then, it may be too late to make a legal challenge to the whole exercise once it is tabled in parliament.

There is however another possibility. Section 9 of the 13th Schedule of the Federal Constitution seems to give the power to the Prime Minister to modify the proposal for the delimitation exercise after it has been submitted to him. (See Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Section 9 of the 13th Schedule of the Federal Constitution which writes that the PM can modify the Election Commission report for the delimitation exercise AFTER it has been submitted to the PM

Given that the BN is desperate to win back Selangor, this is the most likely outcome. The EC can absolve itself from acting in bad faith by putting the responsibility solely on the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister can refer to the Federal Constitution to say that he is acting within his powers, even though by doing so, it would make a mockery of the entire delimitation exercise and the need for public hearings.

What can be done to stop something like this from happening? A few things. Firstly, as many objections must be filed against Syor 2 in Selangor as possible. This will force the EC to have a longer period for the 2nd public hearing and delay the entire process to after the end of the March / April parliament sitting thereby preventing the tabling of the delimitation exercise in parliament. Secondly, the Selangor state government can continue to pursue its legal challenges in court including filing for an injunction against Syor 2 and continuing to challenge the gross malapportionment in Selangor in the Court of Appeal. Only with a concerted and determined effort, do we stand any chance of delaying the unfair and unconstitutional delimitation exercise from being passed in the March / April 2018 parliament sitting.

[1] http://ongkianming.com/2018/01/16/media-statement-the-delimitation-exercise-in-selangor-is-still-unfair-and-unconstitutional/

[2] http://ongkianming.com/2018/01/17/the-selangor-delimitation-exercise-is-guilty-of-ethnic-gerrymandering/




从表面上看来,2018年1月14日所公布的第2季度选民册的选区重划似乎将雪州国会和州选区的边界恢复回2013年大选时的版图。但经过更深入的调查后,我们发现选委会涉嫌“以族群之分来划分选区”,其目的是通过提高马来选民比例来帮助国阵(特别是巫统)夺回部分边缘州议席 在这些座位上,把非马来选民转移到安全的民联州议席。

结果,马来选民人数增加超过 5%约有6个州议席,包括N11依约(ijok), N18淡江(Hulu Kelang), N20 再也谷(Lembah Jaya), N21千百家(Chempaka)易名为班丹英达(Pandan Indah), N53摩立(Morib)和N51昔江港(Sijangkang)。


表1: N11依约(Ijok)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)

其次,伊斯兰党在2013年大选以2881多数票赢得N18淡江(Hulu Kelang)议席。第二季度选区重划建议公布后,该区的马来选民人数比例从80.8%增加至86.6%。

表2: N18淡江(Hulu Kelang)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)

其次,伊斯兰党在2013年大选以8713多数票赢得N20 再也谷(Lembah Jaya)议席。第二季度选区重划建议公布后,该区的马来选民人数比例从54.5%增加至62.2%。

表3: N20再也谷(Lembah Jaya)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)


表4: N21千百家(Chempaka)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)


表5: N51昔江港(Sijangkang)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)


表6: N53魔立(Morib)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)

另一方面,公正党在2013年大选以4044多数票赢得N19国际山庄(Bukit Antarabangsa)议席。第二季度选区重划建议公布后,该区的马来选民人数比例从57.1%降低至41.6%。因此,令人玩味的是,若第二季度建议被通过后,阿兹敏的州议席就成为了以华裔选民占多数的议席(从35.6%提高至50.5%)。

表7: N19国际山庄(Bukit Antarabangsa)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)


表8: N22莲花苑(Teratai)议席的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)

最后,行动党在2013年大选以5391多数票赢得N52直落拿督(Teluk Datuk)议席(易名为万津)。第二季度选区重划建议公布后,该区的华裔选民人数比例从45.0%增加至59.6%。

表9: N52直落拿督(Teluk Datuk)议席(易名为万津)的族群比例(2013年大选VS2季度选区重划建议)


Persempadanan semula Selangor dilakukan secara gerimander bersifat etnik

Kenyataan Media oleh Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Ahli Parlimen Serdang merangkap Penolong Pengarah Pendidikan Politik Kebangsaan pada 17 Januari 2018

Persempadanan semula Selangor dilakukan secara gerimander bersifat etnik

Jika dilihat secara imbas lalu, Syor 2 persempadanan semula Selangor yang diumumkan pada 14 Januari 2018 telah mengembalikan persempadanan kawasan Parlimen dan DUN kepada keadaan asal yang digunapakai ketika PRU 2013. Namun kajian terperinci terhadap daerah mengundi yang dipindahkan menunjukkan bahawa SPR melakukan gerimander (gerrymander dalam Bahasa Inggeris, bermaksud mengubah sempadan pilihan raya untuk memberi kelebihan kepada parti tertentu)  bersifat etnik dengan tujuan membantu Barisan Nasional (khususnya UMNO) untuk memenangi kembali kerusi-kerusi DUN marginal (‘kurang selamat’) dengan meningkatkan peratusan pengundi Melayu di kerusi-kerusi terbabit dan memindahkan pengundi bukan Melayu ke kerusi-kerusi DUN yang selamat untuk Pakatan Harapan.

Hasil daripada Syor 2, terdapat 6 buah kerusi DUN yang menyaksikan pertambahan pengundi Melayu melebihi 5% – iaitu N11 Ijok, N18 Hulu Kelang, N20 Lembah Jaya, N21 Chempaka (dinamakan Pandan Indah), N51 Morib dan N53 Sijangkang.

Di N11 Ijok, kerusi yang dimenangi oleh PKR dengan kelebihan 739 undi dalam PRU 2013, peratusan pengundi Melayu telah bertambah daripada 50% kepada 60.4% dalam Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 1 di bawah).

Rajah 1: Komposisi etnik di N11 Ijok (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di N18 Hulu Kelang yang dimenangi oleh PAS dengan kelebihan 2,881 undi pada PRU 2013, peratusan pengundi Melayu turut bertambah dari 80.8% kepada 86.6% dalam Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 2 di bawah).

Rajah 2: Komposisi etnik N18 Hulu Kelang (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di N20 Lembah Jaya yang dimenangi oleh PAS dengan kelebihan 8,713 undi pada PRU 2013, peratusan pemilih Melayu meningkat daripada 54.5% kepada 62.2% dalam Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 3 di bawah).

Rajah 3: Komposisi etnik di N20 Lembah Jaya (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di N21 Chempaka (yang dicadang ditukar nama kepada Pandan Indah) yang dimenangi oleh PAS dengan kelbihan 9,608 undi pada PRU 2013, peratusan pemilih Melayu turut bertambah kepada 61.7% daripada peratusan asal 53.0% akibat daripada Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 4 di bawah).

Rajah 4: Komposisi etnik N21 Chempaka/ Pandan Indah (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di kerusi N51 Sijangkang yang dimenangi oleh PAS dengan kelebihan 766 undi pada PRU 2013, peratusan undian Melayu meningkat daripada 66.6% kepada 71.7% dalam Syor 2 (Rajah 5).

Rajah 5: Komposisi etnik N51 Sijangkang (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di N53 Morib yang dimenangi oleh PAS dengan 2,942 undi pada PRU 2013, peratusan pengundi Melayu meningkat dari 62.5% kepada 73.4% dalam Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 6 di bawah).

Rajah 6: Komposisi etnik N53 Morib (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Pada masa yang sama, bagi kerusi N19 Bukit Antarabangsa yang dimenangi oleh PKR pada PRU 2013 dengan 4,044 undi, peratusan pemilih Melayu telah berkurangan daripada 57.1% kepada 41.6% dalam Syor 2. Ironinya, kerusi Azmin Ali akan menjadi kerusi majoriti Cina (daripada 35.6% kepada 50.5%) jika Syor 2 diluluskan (lihat Rajah 7 di bawah).

Rajah 7: Komposisi etnik N19 Bukit Antarabangsa (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Di N22 Teratai yang dimenangi oleh DAP pada PRU 2013 dengan majoriti 13,646 undi, peratusan pemilih Cina meningkat dari 59.0% pada PRU 2013 kepada 62.1% dalam Syor 2 (lihat Rajah 8 di bawah).

Rajah 8: Komposisi etnik N2 Teratai (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Yang terakhir, di N52 Teluk Datuk (dicadang ditukar nama kepada Banting) yang dimenangi oleh DAP dengan kelebihan 5,391 undi, peratusan pemilih Cina turut meningkat mendadak daripada 45.0% kepada 59.6% dalam Syor 2 (Rajah 9).

Rajah 9: Komposisi etnik N52 Teluk Datuk/ Banting (PRU 2013 berbanding dengan Syor 2)

Apabila angka-angka ini dikaji semula, jelas bahawa sebab di sebalik perubahan yang dibuat oleh SPR dalam Syor 2 adalah kerana faktor politik iaitu demi membantu UMNO di kerusi-kerusi terlibat.