• Why should BESRAYA toll users pay to get stuck in traffic jams?

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Member of Parliament for Serdang, on the 21st of November 2017

    Why should BESRAYA toll users pay to get stuck in traffic jams?

    Every weekday evening, without fail, there is a long traffic jam starting from the BESRAYA Sungai Besi toll all the way to the Mines Shopping Mall. This bumper to bumper traffic of 2.4km frustrates drivers to no end because motorists are effectively paying to get stuck in traffic jams. This traffic jam has not been reduced even after the implementation of a contra-traffic flow which opens one additional lane after the BESRAYA toll heading towards Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM).

    What many motorists are not aware of is the fact that the government, specifically, the Ministry of Works, can take action against the toll concessionaire if these traffic jams persist. For BESRAYA, the toll concessionaire must ensure a Level of Service (LOS) “C” at the toll plaza and / or at the immediate interchange. Level of Service “C” means a stable or at near free flow of traffic. During peak hours, the Level of Service after the BESRAYA Sungai Besi toll is “F” which is bumper to bumper traffic.

    According to the concession agreement, if the traffic flow falls below the “C” LOS, the toll concessionaire must appoint a traffic consultant to do a traffic assessment. If the traffic consultant confirms that the LOS has fallen to below a “C” level of service, then the concessionaire must apply for flexible tolling. This means that during off peak hours, the toll rate must be reduced by at least 10% (See Table 1 below). This is to encourage more motorists to use the toll road during off-peak hours rather than during peak hours.

    Table 1: Peak and Off-Peak Tolling when LOS falls to below service level “C” during peak hours

    Peak Period

    (a) 6:30 am – 9:30 am

     (b) 4:30 pm – 7 pm

    Toll Rate

    As per this agreement

     As per this agreement

    Off Peak

    (a) 9:31 am – 4:29 pm

    (b) 7:01 pm – 6:29 am

    Toll Rate

    Minimum 10% lower than Agreed Toll in this Agreement

    If a reduction in off-peak toll rates fails to bring the LOS to service level “C”, then the concessionaire must upgrade the Toll Plaza or the affected interchange at their own cost. During this time, the concessionaire must pay the government an amount equivalent to 10% of the estimated costs of the upgrading works per month for the inconvenience caused until the appropriate upgrading work is completed. For example, if the upgrading works cost a total of RM10 million, the concessionaire must pay the government RM1 million a month until the upgrading work is completed.

    The failure of the Ministry of Works to take any action against the BESRAYA toll concessionaire clearly shows that this government has no political will to take on the toll concessionaires. Instead, this BN government has no problems paying millions of RM to these toll concessionaires in compensation for not raising toll rates. The total compensation paid to BESRAYA from the start of the concession period until 2015 was RM77.6 million. Instead of paying out these millions to BESRAYA, the government should ask BESRAYA to solve the traffic jam problem at its Sungai Besi toll and to fine the concessionaire as per the terms and conditions of the concession agreement as long as the traffic problem has not been resolved.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

  • 敦促政府向公众披露捷运3号线的投标规格

    (2017年11月15日)沙登区国会议员王建民博士的媒体声明

    敦促政府向公众披露捷运3号线的投标规格

    当读到财经日报《The Edge Financial Daily》引用捷运公司总执行长Datuk Seri Shahril Mokhtar的访问作为标题:”捷运公司:别政治化招标项目”,我不禁感到十分惊讶。由于捷运2号线有途径沙登选区,因此我认识到与我曾打交道的Shahril和捷运公司的员工向来在回应公众意见向来都表现得十分积极和专业 。因此,当(预计耗资350亿至400亿令吉之间)捷运3号线的建造和融资模式从弃用工程交付伙伴(PDP)模式转为总承包模式(turnkey model)时,他应该更大方接受公众的密切监督。

    早在2011年,捷运公司和陆路公共交通委员会(SPAD) 就一直提倡工程交付伙伴(PDP)模式。[1]陆路公共交通委员会前任行政总裁莫哈末诺曾说道:“在PDP下,延迟交付和成本超支的风险和费用将由承包商承担。因此,PDP确保了单一的问责单位,以便在协议里的截止日期和目标成本之内完成整个项目,或面临金钱上的罚款。这都是一般的工程咨询公司所缺乏的财务管理和承担能力。“

    Shahril也在昨天的媒体发布会上解释,由于捷运公司曾在捷运3号线的地下站扮演PDP的角色,它也借用类似的经验来管理捷运2号线的承包商。他进一步地表示:“由于我们拥有管理捷运地下站的必要经验,因此我认为继续PDP模式与否已不成问题,因为我们有能力像过去般来管理承包商。”由于承包商需负责捷运3号线项目90%的融资,那采用PDP模式的捷运1号线和2号线所面临的奖惩制度是否仍会相同?

    Shahril还指出,捷运3号线的路线需待2018年底才能确认。如果路线未获确认,那欲投标的承包商又要如何准确地评估捷运3号线的总建造成本呢? 相比之下,捷运2号线于2015年5月[2]公开展示,而在同年11月才接受该项目前期工程的首次招标 。在路线公开展示后的1年后,捷运地下站和第一个高架桥的工程项目在2016年3月才被颁发。[3] 如今,有兴趣投标的公司不仅需要尽快草拟建议报告,而且唯有等待招标结束后才能知道捷运项目的全部规格和路线。

    像捷运如此庞大而复杂的项目,这些投标文件通常会以不公开的方式来出售给潜在的投标公司。 但基于这个项目的成本,建造和融资条款的变化及涉及公共利益的重要性,我在此敦促政府公开披露捷运3号线的投标规格,以便回应许多关注这项课题的记者,财务分析师和国会议员。

    王建民博士
    沙登区国会议员

    [1] http://www.mymrt.com.my/cms/upload_files/mediarelease/mediarelease_download_000005.pdf

    [2] https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2015/05/14/details-of-mrt2-project-on-public-display-tomorrow/

    [3] http://www.mymrt.com.my/en/awarded-contracts-ssp

  • Dedahkan tender Laluan 3 MRT kepada awam

    Kenyataan Media oleh Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Ahli Parlimen Serdang pada 15 November 2017

    Dedahkan tender Laluan 3 MRT kepada awam

    Saya terkejut membaca tajuk utama Edge Financial daily semalam (14 November 2017) yang bertajuk “Jangan politikkan garis masa tender – MRT Corp” memetik kata CEO MRT Corp, Datuk Seri Shahril Mokhtar. Sepanjang saya berurusan dengan pihak MRT Corp berkenaan Laluan 2 MRT yang melalui kawasan Serdang, saya mendapati Shahril dan staf beliau di MRT Corp bersikap profesional dan responsif terhadap maklum balas awam. Oleh itu, beliau sepatutnya menjangkakan perhatian daripada orang awam terhadap projek Laluan 3 MRT – yang akan menelan belanja antara RM35 hingga RM40 bilion – apabila model Rakan Projek Pelaksana (PDP) diubah kepada model kontraktor tunggal (turnkey).

    MRT Corp dan SPAD telah pun banyak memuji model PDP seawal 2011.[1] Mantan CEO SPAD, Mohd Nur Kamal telah menulis bahawa “Dalam kes PDP, risiko kelewatan dan kos berlebihan akan ditanggung oleh PDP. PDP menjadi titik akauntabiliti tunggal untuk menyempurnakan keseluruhan projek mengikut jangka masa dan target kos yang dipersetujui, atau perlu menghadapi penalti kewangan, yang tidak mampu ditanggung sama ada dari segi keupayaan kewangan mahupun keupayaan pengurusan oleh sebuah perunding kejuruteraan.”

    Dalam sidang media semalam, Shahril juga menjelaskan bahawa memandangkan MRT Corp bertindak sebagai PDP bagi bahagian bawah tanah Laluan 2, mereka juga boleh menguruskan kontraktor tunggal bagi Laluan 3 dengan cara yang sama. Kata beliau, “Memandangkan kami mempunyai pengalaman untuk menguruskan bahagian bawah tanah, saya fikir bahawa soalan berhubung tidak meneruskan model PDP sepatutnya tidak wujud, kerana kami berkemampuan untuk menguruskan kontraktor tunggal seperti yang kami lakukan sebelum ini”. Namun memandangkan kontraktor tunggal ini akan bertanggungjawab terhadap 90% pembiayaan projek Laluan 3 MRT, adakah insentif dan denda yang telah digunakan bagi model PDP untuk Laluan 1 dan 2 MRT akan turut digunapakai?

    Shahril turut menyatakan bahawa jajaran laluan MRT 3 masih belum ditentukan dan hanya akan ditetapkan pada penghujung 2018. Jika jajaran laluan masih belum ditetapkan, bagaimana pembida boleh menentukan secara tepat kos keseluruhan bagi pembinaan Laluan 3 tersebut? Sebagai perbandingan, jajaran MRT 2 menjalani paparan awam pada Mei 2015[2] dan tender pertama bagi kerja-kerja awalan projek hanya mula diterima pada November 2015. Pakej bagi bahagian bawah tanah dan pakej jejambat pertama hanya dianugerahkan pada Mac 2016, iaitu hampir setahun selepas paparan awam jajaran laluan tersebut.[3] Kini, syarikat pembida bukan sahaja perlu menyediakan kertas kerja dengan pantas, tetapi spesifikasi penuh projek termasuk jajaran laluan hanya akan diketahui selepas tender ditutup.

    Dokumen tender bagi projek sebesar dan serumit MRT kebiasaanya akan dijual kepada pemida berpotensi dan tidak dibuka untuk penelitian awam. Namun disebabkan kos projek ini, perubahan terma pembinaan dan pembiayaan, serta tahap kepentingan awam yang tinggi, saya menggesa supaya spesifikasi tender Laluan 3 MRT ini didedahkan kepada awam untuk menjawab pelbagai persoalan yang diutarakan oleh wartawan, penganalisis kewangan dan Ahli Parlimen.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Ahli Parlimen Serdang

    [1] http://www.mymrt.com.my/cms/upload_files/mediarelease/mediarelease_download_000005.pdf

    [2] https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2015/05/14/details-of-mrt2-project-on-public-display-tomorrow/

    [3] http://www.mymrt.com.my/en/awarded-contracts-ssp

  • Disclose the MRT Line 3 tender to the public

    Media Statement by Dr. Ong Kian Ming, Member of Parliament for Serdang, on the 15th of November 2017

    Disclose the MRT Line 3 tender to the public

    I was surprised to read the headline of the Edge Financial Daily yesterday (14th November 2017) with the title “Don’t politicise tender timeline – MRT Corp” quoting the words of the MRT Corp’s CEO Datuk Seri Shahril Mokhtar. I have found Shahril and his staff at MRT Corp to be very professional and responsive to public feedback in my dealings with them, in the context of the MRT Line 2 which runs through my constituency of Serdang. As such, he should have expected great public scrutiny when the construction and financing model for MRT Line 3 – expecting to cost between RM35 to RM40 billion – is changed from a Project Delivery Partner (PDP) model to a turnkey model.

    MRT Corp and the Land Public Transport Authority (SPAD) have been singing praises for the PDP model as far back as 2011.[1] Former SPAD CEO, Mohd Nur Kamal, wrote that “In the case of the PDP, the risk of delays and cost over-runs is now borne by the PDP for a fee. The PDP provides a single point of accountability to deliver the entire project within agreed time and cost targets, or face financial penalties, something a pure engineering consultancy has no financial capacity or management capability to bear.”

    Shahril, in yesterday’s media briefing, also explained that since MRT Corp acted as the PDP for the underground portion of the MRT Line 2, it can also manage the turnkey contractor for MRT Line 2 in a similar fashion. He said, “Since we have the necessary experiences to manage the underground portion, I think the question of not pursuing the PDP model should not have arisen, as we are capable of managing the turnkey contractor like we have done in the past”. But since the turnkey contractor is also responsible for 90% of the financing of the MRT Line 3 project, will the same incentives and punishments as the PDP model be used for MRT Line 1 and Line 2?

    Shahril also stated that the alignment of MRT Line 3 has not been decided and will only be confirmed by the end of 2018. If the alignment is not confirmed, how can the bidders for the turnkey contractor accurately assess the total cost of building the MRT Line 3? For comparison, the MRT2 alignment went on public display in May 2015[2] and the first tender for the project’s advanced works was accepted only in November of that year. The packages for the underground portion and the first viaduct package was only awarded in March 2016, almost a year after the public display of the alignment.[3] Now, not only will tendering companies have to draw up their proposals very quickly, the full specifications of the project including the route alignment will only be known after the tender closes.

    The tender documents for a project as big and complicated as the MRT will usually be sold to potential bidders and not be available for public scrutiny. But given the cost of this project, the changes in the construction and financing terms, and high level of public interest, I call upon the tender specifications of the MRT Line 3 to be publicly disclosed to answer many of the questions which have been raised by journalists, financial analysts and Members of Parliament.

    Dr. Ong Kian Ming
    Member of Parliament for Serdang

    [1] http://www.mymrt.com.my/cms/upload_files/mediarelease/mediarelease_download_000005.pdf

    [2] https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2015/05/14/details-of-mrt2-project-on-public-display-tomorrow/

    [3] http://www.mymrt.com.my/en/awarded-contracts-ssp

  • 回应针对希望联盟2018年替代预算案中的争议(第二篇章)– 废除大道收费站

    (2017年11月10日)沙登区国会议员王建民博士的媒体声明

    回应针对希望联盟2018年替代预算案中的争议(第二篇章)– 废除大道收费站

    上星期,我回应了那些针对希盟在2018年替代预算案中主张撤除消费税建议的批评。[1] 今天,我想要回应那些针对希盟主张废除收费站建议的批评。

    回应一:过去,政府已向收费大道公司支付数十亿马币的赔偿金,因此为了减缓大道收费起价,也会继续赔偿高达数十亿马币。

    那些批评希望联盟收购大道公司的建议在财政上并不可行的人士,先必须检讨国阵政府目前的政策,包括(i)向大道公司作出赔偿以减缓路费起价(ii)延长大道合约来代替补偿方案(iii)允许大道公司进行不合理的路费起价。

    首先,延迟大道起价的赔偿公式是根据目前的交通流量和合约中所允许的路费上涨的金额来计算。实际上,相比收购大道的方案,政府赔偿的计算方式是对大道公司比较有利,因为前者是根据高速大道的建设成本来计算的。

    例如,如果2018年的大道收费原本应该从2令吉起价到4令吉,政府为了阻止过路费起价,则需按照2令吉乘以会经过该大道的车辆总数的计算结果来支付赔偿金。合约中的起价金额越高,政府的赔偿金则越高。(参阅附录1中的赔偿金额例子)

    政府的赔偿金额(为了不允许路费起价)远超过收购大道公司所需要的费用!事实上,根据我收到的国会答复,政府已经在1990年至2015年期间拨出了40亿令吉作为对大道公司的赔偿,其中包括赔偿给两个合约最早和最糟糕的大道公司,分别是LDP大道的10.5亿令吉和SPRINT大道的4.43亿令吉。(参阅下面的附录2)

    回应二:政府已经签署有利与大道公司的合约和不断补贴这些收费大道

    上述赔偿还不包括政府提供和借给收费大道公司所建造或提升收费站的数百万亿令吉。

    举个例子,我的同事-潘俭伟指出政府曾在2012年向吉隆坡布城大道(MEX)经营者提供了近10亿令吉的拨款,占了该项目总建造成本的74%。[2] 在我的沙登选区,政府也在从MEX大道前往史里肯邦安之间建立了一个耗资9000万令吉的新交汇处,其中政府提供了2000万令吉作为土地收购成本。但大道公司将独享从每辆车所收取的额外2令吉20仙过路费和利润。

    与其继续补贴这些收费大道公司,政府收购这些大道公司和用发展开销的预算来为新建筑或高速大道升级提供拨款会显得更为合理。

    回应3:收购收费大道的成本比赔偿成本加司机过路费更便宜

    在每一份高速大道的特许合约中,总是有一个条款允许政府,根据“国家利益”以便用一定的价格结构来收购特收费大道。

    收购里的条款和内容通常是如下:

    (i)建造成本,减去大道公司和政府拨款的责任和义务。

    (ii)政府进一步有责任向大道公司赔偿其资本股权在其运营期间内介于8%至12%的内部回报率。 如果大道公司已经获得上述所提的回报率,政府就不必履行“内部回报率”的赔偿。

    (iii)收购条款不会包含对大道公司未来预测利润的赔偿。[3]

    在2009年,我的同事-潘俭伟预测政府将花费14亿令吉来收购LDP高速大道合约。[4] 截至2008年,政府已经向LDP大道背后的公司-LITRAK支付了高达6.28亿令吉。[5] 截至2015年,这一赔偿数额将膨胀至高达10.5亿令吉。如果政府不想继续作出这个赔偿,就不得允许LDP大道过路费提高至3.10令吉(向车主征收)。对于在高峰时间常常拥堵的LDP大道,这一笔数额的过路费显得非常荒谬!

    与其质疑希望联盟主张政府收购这些收费大道的建议,这些批评者应该质问政府为何不立即收购大道公司,因为这对政府和道路使用者都能带来长期的经济利益。

    回应4:政府没有执行收费大道公司合约里条款的政治意愿,这也解释了为什么政府十分不愿意收购收费大道

    驾车人士普遍感到沮丧的是,他们往往在收费站前后还要堵塞很长的时间。换言之,他们付钱了还要面对交通堵塞! 举个自己沙登选区的例子,在高峰时段,交通拥堵就发生在从绿野仙踪购物中心前往新街场 BESRAYA收费站之间的3公里路段。

    许多司机不知道的是,BESRAYA合约中有条款规定,大道公司必须采取缓解措施来解决这些交通拥堵所产生的后果。例如,如果高速大道公司无法维持道路上的交通流量方面的“C”级的服务水平(LOS),则必须提供至少便宜10%的非高峰收费方案,以便疏导车流量至非高峰时段。 (BESRAYA傍晚期间的高峰时段为 “F”级的服务水平,车贴车般的拥堵程度)。如果不奏效的话,大道公司必须想法设法地提升收费站和大道来达到在交通流量方面的“C”级服务水平。在工程提升期间,大道公司必须向政府支付相当于每月工程估计费用的10%,以便赔偿在提升工程完成之前给所造成的不便。虽然这些条款都出现在BESRAYA的附加特许合约,但自2014年(最新附加合约的更新年份),链接新街场收费站BESRAYA高速大道的交通状况每况愈下,政府仍然未有效地执行合约里的条款。

    这个例子清楚地显示,政府并没有政治意愿去执行各项收费大道合约里明文规定的条款。大道公司拥有强大的游说力量,来“说服”政府不收购收费大道,以便继续向他们支付昂贵的赔偿金和不执行这些合约里的条款。

    我们不得不留意,政府其实在“说服”收购亏损连连的大道公司是没有面临任何问题 。 例如,柔佛东部疏散大道(EDL)从一开始启动就面临财务困难,并濒临宣布破产。[6]   这也是2018年财政预算案中将要被废除的收费大道之一。政府将通过收购方案来实现这一目标。总成本也未公布。 而这个例子则清楚地显示,如果政府有政治意愿,是可以在满足财政可持续的基础上收购这些收费大道。

    回应5:希望联盟将在收购过程中按照特许合约里的条款来支付适当的赔偿,但在此前,我们需要获得查阅全部收费大道特许合约的所有权限

    有些人担心,希望联盟主张收购这些收费大道合约的建议将导致市场的不确定性,因为许多这样的特许合约都是由上市公司如公积金,国库控股和国家投资机构等官联投资公司或上市公司所拥有。希望联盟将清楚地遵循特许合约中规定的条款来进行收购活动。大道公司在这些高速大道上的投资将获得可观的回报率(而非赚取超额的利润)。

    为了评估收购所有收费大道的总成本,我们需要获得查阅所有收费特许合约的权限。尽管其中一些合约已经被解密,但其他如MEX和PLUS大道的特许合约仍被《官方机密法令》保护。最后, 为了对政府,纳税人,道路使用者和大道公司更负责任和公平,希望联盟在收购大道前都必须仔细地研究这些合约里的条款。

    王建民博士
    沙登区国会议员

    附录一:收费大道赔偿金额的计算方式

    CA = Σ[AT x (2 x TV)] – TA; where:-

    CA: The amount of compensation payable in respect of the relevant

    Operating Year

    Σ: The summation for all classes of vehicles

    AT: The Agreed Toll which should have applied for the relevant Operating

    Year for the particular class of vehicle

    TV: The actual traffic volume for the particular class of vehicle in the

    preceding six (6) months

    TA: The aggregate toll collected by the Concession Company for the

    relevant Operating Year

    附录二:在1990至2015年期间,大道公司所获得的赔偿总额

    [1] http://ongkianming.com/2017/11/02/media-statement-pakatan-harapans-alternative-budget-responding-to-the-critiques-part-1/

    [2] https://dapmalaysia.org/english/2012/mar12/bul/bul4907.htm

    [3] The exceptions are the PLUS owned highways whose concession agreements were renegotiated after PLUS was privatized in 2011. The terms of conditions of the new concession agreement have not been declassified at the time of writing.

    [4] http://www.thenutgraph.com/buy-back-of-privatised-highway-concessions-more-cost-effective/

    [5] http://tonypua.blogspot.my/2009/01/lets-take-our-highways-back.html

    [6] https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/06/249424/two-highway-companies-risk-bankruptcy

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